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4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the case study of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. It begins
with an overview of the political context and an examination of economic
development at both the national and local levels. Qualitative information,
mainly derived from interviews with key actors from different institutions
involved with the construction sector, has been analyzed. The fieldwork
also examined efforts made by the local authority to promote employment
in the construction sector and related services, and to assess how the city
of Bulawayo has been able to apply the principles of decent work through
examples of best practice.
82
P1: SFK/UKS P2: SFK/UKS QC: SFK/UKS T1: SFK
BLBK177-Werna May 30, 2009 16:13
Bulawayo 83
4.2 National, regional and local context
4.2.1 The national context
Map of Zimbabwe: Regional Location of Bulawayo City
Change and continuity: beyond colonial heritage
Although at independence in 1980, Zimbabwe adopted a socialist policy
outlook, it remained a fundamentally capitalist economy (GoZ, 1982). It
has achieved world acclaim in smallholder food production (Eicher, 2003;
Gabre-Madhin & Haggblade, 2004; Rukuni & Eicher, 1994), education and
health (Raftopolous, 2004), infrastructure and decent work provision for
the previously marginalized majority of black Zimbabweans (LEDRIZ,
2005). Zimbabwe was also applauded globally for its ‘national reconcili-
ation policy’ adopted in 1980, its role in brokering peace in Mozambique,
its SADC leadership and its leading role to end apartheid in Namibia and
South Africa. Zimbabwe has been influential globally, for example in UN
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peacekeeping missions in the 1980s and early 1990s in Somalia, Liberia and
the Balkans. However, contradictions characterized the economy; a factor
compounded by continued inequitable land distribution, obsolete indus-
trial equipment and production methods that have not been able compete
in emerging global markets (Bond & Manyanya, 2002).
In an attempt to reverse the economic decline that set in during the mid-
1980s, a reform program, The Economic Structural Adjustment Program
(ESAP), was adopted in 1991 (Bond & Manyanya, 2002) with a view to
opening up the economy, reducing government expenditure and remov-
ing tariffs, etc. However, while the service and tourism sectors experienced
positive growth, increased productivity did not materialize, notably in the
manufacturing sector (Zaaijer, 1998). Instead a rapid increase in income
and consumption inequalities set in, leading to political ferment by the
mid-1990s. At this point, President Robert Mugabe and the ruling ZANU
(PF) party abandoned any remaining aspects of ESAP market economics
promoted by IMF and the World Bank, in favour of pragmatic dictates.
In particular, a combative approach associated with revolutionary lan-
guage became the norm and a land distribution programme, the ‘Third
Chimurenga’, was fast-tracked to the policy forefront from 1995 onwards
on the back of the 1993/94 Rukuni Land Tenure Commission report.
Attempts at dialogue with donors, labour movements, employers and
the intelligentsia, initiated between 1997 and 1998 in an attempt to salvage
the situation, collapsed. By the time of the February 2000 referendum for a
new national constitution (which was rejected by 54.7% of the electorate),
the political atmosphere was completely changed and had become poi-
soned. The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a trade union and
commercial farmer-anchored political party, de-campaigned the draft con-
stitution and came close to defeating the ruling ZANU (PF) at the 2000
Parliamentary elections, in which the MDC got 57 seats against 62 for the
ruling party. Charges of alleged vote rigging, violence, voter intimidation
and human rights abuses in general were made by the MDC, international
human rights groups, the EU, Australia and the USA. On this basis, since
2001 the EU, Australia and the USA have consolidated the isolation of
Zimbabwe (Patel & Chan, 2006), imposing targeted sanctions, blocking
loans to the country (e.g. from IMF, Inter-American Development Bank,
African Development Bank, Inter-American Corporation and the World
Bank) and freezing all bilateral aid, except in extreme humanitarian sit-
uations. It has become increasingly difficult for Zimbabwean firms to do
business in the USA and EU, and vice versa.
USA economic sanctions on Zimbabwe are spelt out inter alia in sec-
tion 4(c) of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (2001).
Lack of transparency in how these countries compile their ‘smart sanc-
tions’ lists was highlighted by Australia’s 2005 list which included people
who were dead, incorrect details and individuals not associated with the
Government; following protests, 53 were subsequently removed from the
list of 127.
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Of late, escalating inflation and a sharp decline in GDP have emerged
as key economic challenges. A rapid rise in inflation since 2000 and mis-
aligned exchange rates make it difficult to calculate accurate US$ GDP fig-
ures from nominal GDP values in Zimbabwe dollars (EIU, June 2005: 27).
Therefore, while GDP has risen sharply in nominal terms, the reality is
the opposite in real terms (CB Richard Ellis, 2006; Intermarket Research,
2004). After political tension, commodity shortages, foreign currency and
food, fuel and electricity shortages, an inflation rate of over 1000% by end
of April 2006 and three million percent by mid-2008 this has been ac-
knowledged as one of the biggest economic challenges the country now
faces.
The Third Chimurenga and the ‘Look East’ foreign and
economic policy
Patel & Chan (2006: 176–177) argue that there is an organic link between
Zimbabwe’s armed struggle for independence (known as the Second
Chimurenga) and the way Zimbabwe has fiercely guarded its sovereignty,
even at great cost in recent times. Having survived military and economic
destabilization by apartheid South Africa as well as sanctions threats from
the UK and USA in the 1980s, Zimbabwe now finds itself facing real eco-
nomic threats as a result of the latter. Since 1997, it has recast defence of its
sovereignty against these threats in the language of the Third Chimurenga,
in which a domestic fast-track land reform is a key component which has
brought about economic destabilization in the short term.
The fast-track land reform program basically converted what were for-
merly white-owned commercial farms which earned foreign currency into
‘nationalized’, production enterprises as part of the peasant system1. Agri-
culture, the backbone of the economy, was decimated. Combined with po-
litical upheavals and economic isolation, the Third Chimurenga has been
followed by rapid economic decline, further political instability, impov-
erishment, unprecedented emigration and the collapse of social services,
health, education and transport. The human development gains from the
first decade of independence have been reversed (LEDRIZ, 2005). Eco-
nomic decline has had a negative impact on any attempts to revive the
agricultural sector. Combined with the impact of HIV/AIDS on the econ-
omy, both industrial and agricultural productivity have continued to fall.
Other problems surface continuously; shortages of fuel, food (e.g. bread,
sugar and cooking oil), electricity, transport, and foreign and even local
currency.
The response of ZANU (PF) has seen a return to the ‘old political guard’
(and mistrust of the ‘young Turks’ within the party); a militarized and
uncompromising ‘sledge hammer’ approach to domestic politics and eco-
nomic management. This is a vitriolic anti-imperialist stance at the global
level and a ‘go-it-alone’ attitude forming the backdrop for the ‘look east
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policy’ aimed at the ‘dispersal of dependence’ (Patel & Chan, 2006: 176).
The ‘look east policy’ is characterized by opening up and extending eco-
nomic, military and diplomatic relations with countries in the East, par-
ticularly Malaysia and China, who supported Zimbabwe’s struggle for
independence prior to 1980. China–Zimbabwe relations have helped to
keep key sectors afloat: Air Zimbabwe, the airforce of Zimbabwe, ZUPCO
(the national bus company) along with mining, building materials produc-
tion and the construction of national projects, such as the Harare Norton
Motorway2. But this has not been able to reverse economic decline in the
short term. For the economy to stabilize and recover, the Chinese invest-
ments may need to be complemented by a comprehensive return of west-
ern resources in the mining and industrial sectors. Capital flight, charac-
terized by ordinary Zimbabweans taking their savings elsewhere, as well
as a negative image of the country held by many in the western world,
needs to be reversed.
Employment and the construction sector
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (2003: 23), the proportion of
the population formally employed in the economy as a whole dropped
from 18% in 1965 to under 10% in 2000. It is therefore understood that
the rest of the population is employed in the informal and peasant sec-
tors (LEDRIZ, 2005). Second, employment since 1980 has made a marked
shift away from manufacturing to sectors such as education, health and
financial services. Agriculture is reported as employing 26% of the for-
mal labour force, as compared to 15% in the manufacturing sector (EIU,
2003: 23).
In terms of share of GDP, the construction sector witnessed a boom in
the 1970s and a general decline in the 1980s and 1990s, with share of GDP
falling from 5%, in the 1970s to 2.5% in the 1990s and 2% in 2001 (EIU,
2003: 30). However, there have also been some short growth periods, such
as the one between 1996 and 1998. The relatively small contribution of
construction to the formal economy can also be seen in terms of employ-
ment. Just over 80,000, or 5%, of the total formal employment in 1998 was
in the construction sector. This fell from about 100,000 workers in 1990
to 90,500 in 1993; 71,800 in 1995; 78,100 in 1997; 53,800 in 2000 and 39,300
by 2003 (CSO, 1998: 11; 2003: 11). Major construction employers include
contractors such as International Holdings, Costain, John Sisk and Sons,
and Gulliver Consolidated. There are many informal contractors, several
operating as sole agents.
The construction sector has been hard hit by economic problems as these
have led to high constructions costs (see Table 4.1). The rapid rise in costs
can be observed in the cost index (last column in Table 4.1) or the de-
tailed price indices for civil engineering and building materials (see Table
4.2). Prices escalations were a futile attempt for firms to reverse serious
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Table 4.1 Construction (building) cost increases, 1995--2004 (Z$/m2)
Standard Standard Standard Arithmetic Index:
Year house factory office block mean 1995 = 100
1995 2300 1300 2500 2033 100
1996 2650 1675 3000 2442 120
1997 3530 2270 4720 3507 172
1998 4950 3190 6620 4920 242
1999 8915 5760 12,040 8905 438
2000 17,025 10,978 17,275 15,093 742
Mid-2001 29,200 18,000 30,950 26,050 1281
Mid-2002 56,000 34,000 59,350 49,783 2448
Mid-2003 800,000 550,000 750,000 700,000 34,426
Feb 2004 1,750,000 1,200,000 1,650,000 1,533,333 75,410
Source: Robertson Economic Information Services, Harare, Zimbabwe, 2006.
liquidity problems. However, the cycle of rises and reduced demand led
to reduced production closures.
Cement production, a key component in the construction sector, has
been paralyzed by closures or reduced capacity of the main cement
plants3. Problems arise due to fuel shortages or lack of spare parts, af-
fecting coal production and the capacity of the National Railways of
Zimbabwe (NRZ) to transport coal to cement plants. Thus, in 2003, one
after the other, the Sino-Zimbabwe Plant, Portland Cement, Unicem and
Circle Cement reduced or closed operations for long periods4. The ce-
ment shortages soon after 2000 hit the construction sector, which had been
booming a few years before. Some media reports projected a recovery after
20055.
The backward and forward links in the economy create a domino effect,
experienced not only in the construction sector but also throughout other
sectors of the economy. The fertilizer production industry, for example, has
been equally affected, with fertilizer shortages affecting agricultural pro-
ductivity, even in periods of plentiful rain, such as 2005–2006. With con-
struction costs rising, both institutional and individual clients have found
it more and more difficult to construct new buildings or infrastructure.
This is the environment within which local authorities need to initiate lo-
cal economic development and promote decent work.
Local government in Zimbabwe
Local authorities in Zimbabwe primarily implement powers given to them
by the Ministry of Local Government and Housing. For the administration
of urban areas, this is done in line with The Urban Councils Act [214] and
the Regional Town and Country Planning Act [Chap. 29: 12] and all its al-
lied statutes. The Urban Councils Act [214] provides for the establishment
of urban local authorities, whose categories range from the smallest area
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boards, through the local boards, town councils and municipal councils to
the largest category of city councils. Local authorities can raise revenues
and provide services in areas of their jurisdiction.
As with the national economy, the Government’s priority soon after in-
dependence was democratization and de-racialization: to create unified or
unitary local authorities in both rural and urban areas with public sec-
tor investment largely targeted at the formerly neglected rural communal
lands – home to 70% of the national population. Rural local authorities
have fewer resources and less autonomy than urban local authorities. In
both cases, local authorities are run by an executive consisting of bureau-
crats (responsible for health, planning, housing, finance, works and trans-
port, etc.) on the one hand and a political council made up of members
elected by residents on the other. Large cities and metropolitan areas also
have an executive mayor elected by residents from the area6.
Mutizwa-Mangiza (1991) concluded that, unlike in larger parts of
Africa, the administration of urban local authorities in Zimbabwe in gen-
eral was sound and that of Bulawayo in particular was encouraging and
exemplary. Urban local authorities have a relatively large degree of auton-
omy in terms of finances and organization. Bulawayo, in particular, has
earned a reputation nationally and internationally as a well managed city
(Hamilton & Ndubiwa, 1994; Zaaijer, 1998).
While urban local authorities can raise revenue and provide services
in their areas of jurisdiction, there are other institutional entities that op-
erate as local authorities in the same areas, such as parastatals like the
Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), the Zimbabwe National Water Au-
thority (Zinwa)7 and the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA),
which in 1986 took over the supply and administration of electricity from
city councils. Elsewhere, institutions like mining companies and other
parastatals may operate as local authorities in some instances. Social se-
curity issues within a local authority area, like Bulawayo, for example, are
administered by NSSA and in this case Bulawayo has little input into its
management.
Key institutional changes since the mid-1990s have seen central govern-
ment putting more controls on how the urban local authorities can imple-
ment the Urban Councils Act. In particular, the introduction of the exec-
utive mayor in the late 1990s had meant that decisions that would have
previously been made by consensus of the council based on advice from
the technical heads of departments could now be overridden by the ex-
ecutive mayor in liaison with the minister. The resulting tensions led to
the phenomenon of ‘commissions’, appointed by the minister of local gov-
ernment to run the affairs of council in place of the elected councillors
and mayor. The instability and uncertainty in Harare’s governance is il-
lustrated by continuous conflicts at the top; heads of departments are con-
tinuously hired and fired or hold posts in an acting capacity. For instance,
top management in 2006 comprised of: acting chamber secretary, acting
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human resources manager, acting director of housing and community ser-
vices, acting director of waste management, acting director of finance, act-
ing director of works and acting director of health services. While this has
been the case in Mutare, Chitungwiza, Norton and especially in Harare,
the capital, Bulawayo has been able to ‘survive’ this unpleasant scourge
(see Sachikonye, 2006; Zaaijer, 1998).
The ruling party ZANU (PF) has consistently lost the urban vote in na-
tional and urban local elections since 2000, leading to a highly contested
political environment. In a bid to exert greater management control over
the two metropolitan areas of Harare and Bulawayo, the Government in-
troduced the office of a resident minister in charge of the area. What this
means is that the mayor is no longer the highest local government politi-
cian in the area, but the resident minister. In addition, while reporting to
the Minister of Local Government and Housing, the council and the mayor
must also report to the resident minister.
Thus, above the category of city council, we now have a ‘metropolitan
authority’ appointed by the central government, not elected by the people.
This basically means that the degree of autonomy that existed in the 1980s
(Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1991) has now been significantly eroded. Through the
resident minister and the commission, appointed by the minister to run
the affairs of Harare and Chitungwiza8 since the late 1990s, there is gen-
erally more centralization than decentralization of power in urban admin-
istration. For Bulawayo, potential tensions and conflicts arising from this
arrangement have been avoided, partly because of the city’s distance from
national political power struggles as well as the culture of the administra-
tion, which prioritizes service to the people over politics (interview with
Mayor of Bulawayo, April 2006).
4.2.2 Regional and local context
Bulawayo, the city of kings
Bulawayo’s modern history can be traced back to the 1890s when it was
transformed from the Ndebele settlement of grass thatched huts to the re-
gional city it is today (Hamilton & Ndubiwa, 1994). It is located in a dry
agro-ecological region whose hinterland covers Zimbabwe’s Midlands,
Matabeleland South and Matabeleland North provinces, as well as large
parts of Botswana, South Africa and Zambia. Wildlife and mineral wealth
are key natural resources in this hinterland. There have been major finds
in methane gas in the Lupane and Hwange areas (Bulawayo City, 2000: 7).
It was the industrial capital of Zimbabwe in the early years before Harare
took over in the 1970s. It remains the headquarters of the Railways of Zim-
babwe (the second largest employer after the Government) and boasts rail-
way links to Botswana, South Africa, Mozambique and Zambia, leading
to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola. The Joshua Muqabuko
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Nkomo International Airport provides links to tourist destinations such as
the Victoria Falls and Hwange National Park, as well as regional resorts in
Namibia, Botswana and South Africa.
At its industrial peak and before the advent of the Economic Structural
Adjustment Programs of the early 1990s, Bulawayo had a diverse indus-
trial base and comprehensive engineering industry that included textiles9,
radio manufacturing (the largest in Africa) a tyre factory, and hide and
meat processing. It now has a range of training facilities and services for
railways and the mining industry, and is home to the National Free Li-
brary, the large Mpilo Central Hospitals, a stadium able to host inter-
national games and the National University of Science and Technology
(partly still under construction since opening in 1991). Bulawayo is also
home to the Zimbabwe International Trade Fair (laid out over twenty-five
hectares), through which the country can showcase its industries to the
world. Bulawayo is a cultural centre, not only in terms of Ndebele tradi-
tions, but nationally and regionally in terms of the labour and nationalist
movements whose formative years were there. Its hinterland (in places
like the Matopo Hills, Gwaai catchment, Shangani area and Khami Ruins)
bears witness to Zimbabwe’s history of violence, struggle and pride.
Administratively, Bulawayo rose from a sanitary board in 1894 and mu-
nicipal council in 1897 to a city in 1943 (Hamilton & Ndubiwa, 1994). The
areas around Bulawayo are administered by five rural local authorities
(Bulawayo City, 2000) including Umguza, Umzingwane and the Depart-
ment of National Parks and Wildlife Management, which administers the
wildlife areas. The provision of water to the city has been a constant prob-
lem from as early as the 1980s, and the drought of 1991/1992 was a real
threat to the sustainability of the city. The Government and the city have an
ongoing programme to construct the Gwaai-Shangani Dam, some 350 km
to the north of the city, from which water will be conveyed by pipelines.
A long-term solution to the city’s water problems in the form of a pipeline
from the Zambezi River has thus far remained a strictly theoretical propo-
sition, due not only to the huge cost and alleged local politics involved,
but also the regional geo-political and environmental concerns that need
to be resolved. Associated with these water problems is the issue of sewers
that are now overloaded; although new works are planned or under way
(Bulawayo City, 2000: 9).
Further threats to Bulawayo’s sustainability are the national economic
conditions described elsewhere in this report, and the HIV/AIDS epi-
demic (Bulawayo City, 2000), which has put a strain on household and
enterprise economies. Thus, the revenue base of Bulawayo is under threat.
In addition, the harsh economic climate has seen default in payments of
rates, not only by households and firms but also by central government
departments – with the council owed up to Z$450 million in 2000 (Bul-
awayo City, 2000: 12)10. The bulk of the council’s recurrent expenditure
(about 61%) is spent on salaries.
P1: SFK/UKS P2: SFK/UKS QC: SFK/UKS T1: SFK
BLBK177-Werna May 30, 2009 16:13
92 Labour Conditions for Construction
According to the CSO census figures, while the city’s population is
growing, the rate of growth has slowed from 5.9% in the 1970s, to 4.5%
between 1982 and 1992, to between 3.1% and 2.4% during the 1992–1997
period and around 2% in the post-2000 period. This is largely due to re-
duced economic opportunities and lower rural-to-urban migration. In-
stead, those not migrating to seek income opportunities in Harare have
looked to Botswana and South Africa, especially after 1982. HIV/AIDS, as
well as general decline in fertility rates, has also contributed to this decline
in growth rates. Consequently, Bulawayo’s projected population figures of
1,011,037 in 2000; 1,184,637 in 2005 and 1,562,905 in 2015 have turned out
to be higher than the census returns, for example the census results of 2002
gave a total population of just 700,000 (CSO, 2002).
The preceding sections have provided a panoramic view of local author-
ities in Zimbabwe and how Bulawayo operates in a challenging economic
climate. The institutional and political challenges facing the city (such as
water) have also been signposted. Zaaijer (1998: 1) captured concerns that
while Bulawayo’s conservatism and excessive preoccupation with ‘rules’
are the reasons behind its status of a ‘best managed’ city, such an admin-
istrative character may stifle innovations. The sections that follow will
demonstrate that, contrary to such fears, Bulawayo has achieved strategic
innovations in the urban development sector; successes with direct posi-
tive impacts on construction activity and employment creation.
Key concerns in Bulawayo’s local economic development are droughts
and the water crisis, as well as the ESAP policy of the 1990s. ESAP
introduced institutional reforms and economic restructuring (Bond &
Manyanya, 2002) that led to a decline in industrial output from 32% in
1979 to 25% in 1995 (Zaaijer, 1998: 23). In particular, the opening up of
the economy led to inflows of cheaper goods from global markets, forcing
local companies either to close or lay off workers (Intermarket Research,
2004: 14–15 and 28). Key informants are always quick to mention the 1000
workers retrenched at Merlin in 1995 and that over 10,000 workers lost
their jobs in the 1990s alone. CSO (2004: 31) figures confirm that this in-
dicated a decline in formal economy jobs from 153,200 in 1989 to 134,500
in 2002 – close to 20,000 jobs lost in the city over a twelve-year period.
Most of these workers either sought work in South Africa or went back
to the rural areas. Those who stayed in Bulawayo found themselves in
the informal economy. By the mid-1990s, up to 40% of the working age
population was in the informal economy. Activities in this sector followed
the national pattern of shifts from manufacturing to services, retailing and
trade (Kanyenze et al., 2003).
Local economic development in Bulawayo
This section pursues the question of key actors, policies and programs
involved in local economic development, employment creation and
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responses to decent work challenges. In particular, it considers the role of
Bulawayo City in strategic planning and the development process around
which significant construction activity takes place. It shows how partner-
ships between the city and the private sector are central to the success
witnessed in the city. As already noted, Bulawayo has been championed
nationally and internationally for its unique physical and social outlook
(Hamilton & Ndubiwa, 1994; Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1991; Zaijer, 1998). It is
a well planned and managed city driven by a deep-seated City Hall his-
torical culture geared to serve the people, irrespective of political or social
orientation. While the attractive and harmonious environment is easily no-
ticed, less noticeable are the strategic decisions made by the city’s leaders.
A number of these qualify as best practices.
In 1982, Bulawayo was Zimbabwe’s first post-independence city to pro-
duce a city master plan in accordance with the Regional Town and Coun-
try Planning Act (1976). This served as a framework for the city’s infras-
tructure development, housing delivery and service provision. It enabled
the city to accommodate the huge influx of rural migrants following the
abolition in 1980 of prohibitive colonial structures, which had restricted
the movement and urban citizenship of the African population. In another
demonstration of its commitment to planned development, Bulawayo was
the first to initiate revisions to its master plan, culminating in the 2000 to
2015 Master Plan, adopted in 2000 in accordance with section 20 of the Re-
gional Town and Country Planning Act (1996 revised edition). Unique in
the revision process and its outcomes, was a conscious integration of spa-
tial strategic thinking on the one hand, and organizational strategy, mo-
bilization of resources, budgeting, strategic socio-economic planning and
stakeholder involvement on the other. Urban agriculture is now an inte-
gral part of local economic development planning for the city.
Bulawayo’s 2000–2015 Master Plan took the lead (in Zimbabwe) in
transforming city planning from a purely land-use, physical-planning en-
deavour into a broader, more responsive and dynamic strategic activity
that turns the plan into a corporate management tool. As with the 1982
version, the new plan aims to ensure sufficient land for commercial, indus-
trial, residential and institutional development, to enhance the investment
climate and stimulate local economic development, and to act as a frame-
work for employment creation and social, recreational and cultural activ-
ities. Bulawayo’s management is in this way always ten years ahead of
events. For example, at any time, the city has planned and serviced land to
accommodate thousands of new dwellings. Over the past five years when
resources for bulk infrastructure development have been hard to get, the
city has adopted infill development strategies.
To summarize, Bulawayo was the first city in Zimbabwe to produce a
master plan, the first to revise its master plan and the first to produce
a strategic plan and corporate strategy. At any one time in the 1990s,
the city had a stock of up to 30,000 planned and serviced stands for
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Box 4.1 Indicators of Bulawayo City’s success in delivery of low-
income housing
 Between the 1989/1990 and 1993/1994 financial year, 32,750 low-
income dwelling units were constructed to accommodate over
200,000 people at an average occupancy rate of six persons per
dwelling (Bulawayo City, 1995).
 For the five years prior to 2005, a total of 25,000 houses were con-
structed to house more than 120,000 people (city planner, interview
April 2006).
residential development. Currently, despite the tough economic environ-
ment, Bulawayo has serviced land for low-income residential develop-
ment, including 1000 stands in Pumula South, 10,000 in Cowdray Park
and 7000 in Emganwini. According to the city planner, surveys that used
to be two years ahead of time are now close to three years ahead. This
has been achieved through use of joint private sector and local author-
ity survey teams. It is expected that new land for up to 43,000 residential
stands will be available by the end of 2006 in the area between the Joshua
Mqabuko Nkomo Airport and Trenance. The main barrier to be overcome,
which has been a consistent one over the years, is the provision of off-site
infrastructure, especially water and sewerage.
The City Master Plan 2000–2015 sets aside land for the establishment of
major water treatment works to the north of the city to process and man-
age water when Government investments in the planned Gwaai-Shangani
pipeline materialize (Bulawayo City, 2000: 114–115). See Box 4.1.
Partnerships for local economic development
Bulawayo’s success in implementing its strategic plans has been achieved
through a combination of delivery models that enable partnerships among
stakeholders. In the mid-1990s, Bulawayo signed partnership agreements
with construction investors from Malaysia. Promoted by the central gov-
ernment, this saw the creation of Zimbabwe–Malaysia Holdings (ZIMAL
Holdings) to produce bricks and construct up to 15,000 housing units in
Cowdray Park. The progress on this is given in Appendix 4.1 at the end of
this chapter. Bulawayo was thus a direct beneficiary of the Government’s
‘look east’ policy long before the post-2000 economic crisis.
Other partnerships have included employers providing employer-
assisted accommodation, such as the Zimbabwe National Army in the
past, or CABS Building Society’s ongoing project in Pumula South; inter-
national development donors, such as USAID and the World Bank (es-
pecially in the 1980s and 1990s); Building Brigades, Self-Help; private
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sector financiers and construction companies (both large and small) and
the Government.
A recent example is the housing development partnership that saw
private companies, the city and individual households constructing an
agreed numbers of units with financial support from the Reserve Bank
of Zimbabwe (RBZ). Traditionally the RBZ does not participate in such
projects. However, given the economic environment, where local author-
ities do not have enough resources for development projects, combined
with the bank’s need to promote inflows of diaspora foreign currency, the
RBZ put forward Z$8.3 billion to service 119 stands in Parklands East and
245 stands in Mahatshula. These have been allocated to home seekers on
the waiting list for development. The funds also supported servicing of an-
other 101 stands at Emganwinini II Millennium Housing Scheme, where
construction is complete.
Bulawayo’s strategic planning and management framework has en-
hanced a consistently developing investment climate, despite national and
global economic constraints. The construction of housing and related ur-
ban development activities has generated both direct and indirect employ-
ment. Although no employment figures are available, it is clear that even
where the local authority itself is not involved in construction, the avail-
ability of serviced land has enabled many private sector and informal op-
erators to create employment in the city.
Bulawayo City incentives to promote investment and
employment creation
As part of its long-term strategy from the early 1990s, Bulawayo put in
place a package of incentives to encourage indigenous black Zimbab-
weans to invest in commerce and industry –areas they had been excluded
from for decades – to attract new sustainable industry and commerce and
to consolidate the operations of existing investors. Incentives covered ac-
cess to land, tax rebates and holidays, special tariffs for water and service
charges, guaranteed project approval times, waivers of plan-approval fees
and speedy allocation of housing land to workers associated with the in-
vesting companies.
It is crucial to emphasize that this package of incentives was not a bam-
bazonke – siNdebele term meaning he/she who grabs everything. This
package of incentives was designed not to be ‘for everyone and every-
thing’ but was strategically targeted. There was a clear set of criteria to dis-
criminate in favour of preferred investors and developers; criteria based
on the number of people to be employed, size of the investment in terms
of dollars, new technology to be introduced, participation of local or in-
digenous persons, export orientation of the industry and pioneers. The
way the incentives would work is described in Appendix 4.2 at the end of
this chapter. The incentives could be provided in different combinations
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and the table structure makes it feasible for different sections of the local
authority to review their set of inputs into the package. The table is orga-
nized as follows: one chooses a developer (first column on the left) then
moves across the row to check existing incentives available to the investor.
For example, local/indigenous persons (row o) have a lease option avail-
able (column 3) as well as professional services and incubation support. In
the event that the local/indigenous investor happens to be an employer of
say 200 people, then he/she would be able to purchase land from the city
at 80% of the original cost (intersection of row b and column 2). Assuming
that she/he had an investment worth between 5–10 million dollars, then
a two-year tax holiday would apply, as well as guaranteed approval times
of 90 days for the project application and 30 days for the plan application,
plan fees at 60% of the original price and availability of electricity connec-
tions to the development site.
These time incentives are noteworthy given that Zimbabwe has had
some of the slowest turn-around times for land-use planning, surveys and
building plan approval; it has an overall time of forty months, compared
to the sub-Sahara average of about twenty-three months and global aver-
age of about twelve (GoZ/USAID, 1994: 28). Ordinarily, processing of the
building application alone would take 3.75 months for Bulawayo, com-
pared to 5.75 months for Harare. Clearly, with such delays and in the
absence of special package and preferential treatment, the cost of doing
business with and investing in cities in Zimbabwe is prohibitive. Thus, it
is this package of incentives that has led to sustained housing and urban
development in Bulawayo, even in lean years.
The construction sector in Bulawayo
The vibrancy of the construction sector is considered a good indicator of
the ‘health status’ of a nation or city’s economy. Using the values of build-
ing plans approved over time in Harare and Bulawayo, it is clear that the
construction sector has seen a gradual decline since 1989/1990, although
there have been periodic booms like that in the mid to late 1990s. While
nominal values of plans approved and actual work done have seen dra-
matic growth, in real terms the decline is significant (compare Figure 4.1
against Figure 4.2).
Computations based on construction data (CSO, 2001) show that the
value of work done in 1999/2000 (excluding repairs and alterations) was
6% (Harare) and 11% (Bulawayo) of similar work done in 1989/1990. The
cost of materials has risen to levels that make building unprofitable as a
business and unaffordable for many households. This is associated with a
reduced supply of materials for both local and imported components.
There are also a number of further trends and changes in the status
of construction in Zimbabwe that can be exemplified by the Bulawayo
scenario:
P1: SFK/UKS P2: SFK/UKS QC: SFK/UKS T1: SFK
BLBK177-Werna May 30, 2009 16:13
Bulawayo 97
0
2,000,000
4,000,000
6,000,000
8,000,000
10,000,000
12,000,000
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
Va
lu
e 
of
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
pl
an
s 
(10
00
 Z$
)
Harare Bulawayo
Figure 4.1 Building plans approved in Harare and Bulawayo, values in thousands of Zimbabwe
dollars (nominal values)
Sources: Original data from CSO Construction Bulletin 2001 (p. 19) and Construction Bulletin 2003 (p. 41),
Government of Zimbabwe, Harare.
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Figure 4.2 Building plans approved in Harare and Bulawayo, values in thousands of US$
Sources: Original data from CSO Construction Bulletin 2001 (p. 19) and Construction Bulletin 2003 (p. 41),
Government of Zimbabwe, Harare.
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Figure 4.3 Repair and alterations April 2006; formerly Downings Bakery building to be Bulawayo
HQ for the mobile phone company ECONET Pvt (Ltd). Corner of Robert Mugabe and Leopold
Takawira Avenue (facing north east). Photograph courtesy of B Mbiba.
 A switch from new construction projects towards repairs, alterations
and maintenance. Construction in Bulawayo CBD dried up at the end
of the 1990s and only small repairs and alterations are visible (Fig-
ure 4.3). Large public sector projects, like the National University of
Science and Technology, are also affected by the unavailability of ma-
terials and high costs, leaving buildings unfinished for years.
 The decline in the economy and shrinking of construction have re-
sulted in the exodus of construction firms and qualified bricklayers,
artisans, carpenters and others to other countries in the region, notably
Mozambique, South Africa and Botswana. According to key infor-
mants, this has led to shortages of such skills, allowing the few remain-
ing to demand high fees for their work. Individuals have moved from
the formal sector to the informal, while some companies have closed
shop, scaled down or diversified into other activities.
 Figure 4.4 shows the decline in residential construction activity since
1997. This is the sector with the capacity to employ many people, par-
ticularly those in the informal category. The 1990s boom in low-cost
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Figure 4.4 Building plans approved in Bulawayo
Source: Data from CSO Construction Bulletin 2001 (p. 19, nominal values), Government of Zimbabwe,
Harare.
housing has subsided due to the reduction in public sector funding,
but remains an area of activity in Bulawayo’s western suburbs. Com-
bined with repairs and alterations, new development is stimulated by
resources from the diaspora, especially those who live and work in
South Africa and popularly referred to as injiva.
Injiva construction activities are concentrated in the housing sector,
largely to accommodate family members, rent out or as an investment for
income after retirement. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has initiated a
Homelink project designed to help those parts of the diaspora to build
or buy houses, although not every injiva takes advantage of this possibil-
ity. Injiva house construction (reportedly two in every five houses under
construction) supports a vibrant informal construction economy. Builders
and artisans in the informal sector have good skills, most of which were
acquired in the formal industry both in and outside the construction sec-
tor. A detailed assessment of the nature of the informal construction sector
and its broader economic links would be a valuable exercise in the future.
The ongoing Government housing programme Hlalani Kuhle has also
boosted the construction sector in Bulawayo. This is a housing programme
initiated for those whose shelters were destroyed in 2005 by the Gov-
ernment’s Operation Murambaswina. In Bulawayo, as elsewhere, the
Zimbabwe National Army is a lead agent in the construction of Hlalani
Kuhle houses, although Bulawayo equipment and workers are also
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involved. Unfortunately, sensitivities surrounding this programme made
it impossible to interview representatives of agencies or workers involved
in the construction; our team was barred from entering construction sites.
There is also some private sector construction activity, such as the
construction of houses in Pumula South, which was funded by CABS
Building Society. The largest project with private sector involvement,
however, is the Cowdray Park development, which is in turn linked to
Bulawayo’s long-term strategic plans to construct thousands of middle
and low-income houses.
4.3 Decent work indicators
This section presents the results of the statistical compilation of key indi-
cators, in particular those regarding the four components of decent work:
employment, social security, workers’ rights and social dialogue. The fo-
cus is largely on the formal sector, although some respondents have ar-
gued that formal sector figures equate to the informal, since from the mid-
1990s the whole economy has been ‘informalized’. Where possible, the role
of key agents in promoting decent work, and notably the contribution of
the city of Bulawayo, will be highlighted. However, the main objective of
this chapter is to provide comparative indicators. Rather than presenting
the information and the analysis separately, the approach is to offer some
analysis and possible conclusions immediately after each set of primary
data is presented.
4.3.1 Indicators of employment
Unemployment
The unemployment rate is calculated by measuring the proportion of the
population aged 15 and above that was unable to find work in a given
period. The trends for the country are summarized in Table 4.3. The con-
struction sector unemployment rates are low at both the national and local
levels, although the local level shows a significant increase in unemploy-
ment conditions from 2000 to 2005. The remainder of this section will ex-
plain why these figures are much lower than those reported by the media
and non-government organizations (NGOs).
In the 1999–2000 period, 230,463 of those in the working age group were
unemployed throughout the country and 40,837 at the Bulawayo City
level. The Census Report (2002) shows regional variations in unemploy-
ment rates, with Bulawayo recording the highest level at 25.29%, followed
by Harare at 18.12%. These regional variations are described in Figure 4.5
and show that the unemployment rate in Bulawayo is clearly the highest
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Table 4.3 Unemployment indicators1 (%)
1990 2000
Unemployment rate in all sectors at national level 11 9
Unemployment rate in all sectors at city level, Bulawayo 16 17
Sources: 2000 figures are taken from the 1999 Indicator Monitoring Labour Force Sur-
vey; those for 1990 are from the 1994 Indicator Monitoring Labour Force Survey and
Labour Statistics (CSO).
1 Figures for the national level assume that communal farm workers and those in the
informal economy are all employed.
in the country. Focusing on Bulawayo as a case study thus addresses a real
problem in practice.
The unemployment rates are based on current employment, not usual
employment. Current employment refers to what the survey respondents
were doing in the seven days prior to the day of the survey (restricted
definition), while usual employment relates to the last 12 months prior to
the day of the survey (broad definition). The current employment figures
may be affected by temporary jobs and seasonal working, depending on
when in the year the survey is conducted. CSO (2004: 13) notes that 1992
recorded the highest unemployment rate at 22%, possibly due to the fact
that the 1991–1992 drought affected agriculture, forestry and the fishing
industry.
If communal farm workers and own account workers are considered as
employed, the level of unemployment is very low (6.9% at the national
level). This contrasts sharply with the 80% unemployment figures used
particularly in media circles and by NGOs (see for example Rory Carroll,
The Guardian, 2006: 21; Sachikonye, 2006).
Figures for the construction sector at both the national and city levels are
taken as similar to the urban unemployment rates generally. The figures
for those seeking work in the construction sector are not available due to
the lack of a records system for those seeking work. Employment agencies
are close to non-existent and people rely on word of mouth (social capital),
Bulawayo 25.29%Harare 18.2%
Masvingo 6.64%
Midlands 0.03%
Mat. South 9.76%
Mat. North 10.09%
Mash. West 14.3%
Mash. East 9.33%
Mash. Central 8.25%
Manicaland 8.11%
Figure 4.5 Unemployment by province in Zimbabwe, 2002
Source: Census 2000 National Report (CSO, 2002: 99), Government of Zimbabwe, Harare.
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74.6% asked friends
and relatives
12.2% other
0.3%
registered with an
employment
agency
3.9%
applied or responded
to advert
9.1%
checked at work sites
Figure 4.6 Methods of job search for the unemployed in Zimbabwe
Source: 1999 Indicator Monitoring Labour Force Survey (CSO, 2000: 82), Government
of Zimbabwe, Harare.
as well as physical job searches in the industrial areas. The lack of formal
sector jobs also means that many unemployed are dissuaded from seeking
employment. According to both the 1994 and 1999 Indicator Monitoring
Labour Force Surveys, at least 75% of those seeking work asked friends
and relatives and less than 1% made use of employment agencies. These
job search patterns are summarized in Figure 4.6 and were confirmed in
field interviews. Tzircalle Brothers stated that they subcontract some of
their bricklaying, roofing, fitting and carpentry work to former employees
now working as either sole agents or small informal contractors.
When jobs become available, no advertisements are posted. Instead, the
message is sent out through a vast network of contacts, which has been
progressively established since the 1970s. Similarly, informal builders in
Cowdray and Pumula South identified networks of friends, family and
former clients (in Bulawayo, Botswana and South Africa) as sources of
information on new jobs. The implications of this are that it would be in-
appropriate and inaccurate to attempt to estimate statistical indicators of
volumes of work, shift work, bonded work and so on. What can be said
is that the volume of available work has declined since 1996–1998, follow-
ing buoyant years since the 1980s. Construction firms and tradesmen have
relocated to neighbouring countries, moved to other businesses or closed
down completely. When jobs become available, remaining tradesmen are
able to charge very high prices, even in the informal economy.
Low wages
The low wage rate is measured by the number of employed persons earn-
ing less than half the median wage for the given year or period. Table 4.4
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Table 4.4 Low wage rate indicator (%)
1990 2000
Low wage rate in all sectors at the national level n/a 25
Source: 2000 figures are taken from the 1999 Indicator Monitoring Labour Force Survey
(CSO).
shows that in general about one third of the working population earns be-
low half the median income. This method of presenting low wage rates is
at variance with standard practice in Zimbabwe where the CSO uses av-
erage earnings based on the arithmetic mean. Table 4.5 aims to give the
pattern of average earnings at the national level, a pattern that applies to
all sectors of the economy and at all spatial levels.
Table 4.5 also shows that before the advent of Economic Structural Ad-
justment Programme (ESAP) in 1991, average earnings were very high
in real terms but have not improved since the rapid decline in the early
1990s. The exchange rate of the Z$ to US$ remained stable during the
1980s (as low as 0.6093 in 1985 and 0.5147 in 1988), before rising sharply
after 1991. While nominal wages have increased, the real wage declined
rapidly, especially after 2001. This decline was associated with the liber-
alization of the economy, which included removal of wage controls (see
Bond & Manyanya, 2002). Until the early 1990s, the difference between
real and nominal wages was small but this has increased significantly since
the mid-1990s. As depicted in Figure 4.7, real wages have shrunk rapidly,
particularly in the last decade.
Wages alone are no longer enough. As discussed elsewhere, there are
other inflation-busting packages that have significant positive impact on
the welfare of workers, for example provision of transport and meals at the
Table 4.5 Average earnings per person per month and exchange rate during
1990−2001 for the national economy
Average earnings/person/month
Z$ per unit
Year of US$ Z$ US$
1990 0.3793 586.64 1546.64
1991 5.0511 683.71 135.36
1992 5.4815 779.90 142.28
1993 6.9350 891.65 128.57
1994 8.3871 1046.98 124.83
1995 9.3109 1266.17 135.99
1996 10.8389 1685.18 155.47
1997 18.6081 2387.73 128.32
1998 37.3692 3224.81 86.30
1999 38.1388 4649.84 121.92
2000 55.0660 8409.59 152.72
Source: CSO (2004: 74) Zimbabwe Labour Statistics, Central Statistical Office, Harare.
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Figure 4.7 Nominal and real wages (1985−2004)
Source: Provided by the Labour and Economic Development Research Institute (LEDRIZ), Harare, March
2006.
workplace. The negotiation of wages is done through the NEC – a process
in which Bulawayo City has no role, except when it comes to negotiating
with those workers it employs.
Hours of work
For this study hours of work are calculated by measuring the proportion
of wage earners working more than 45 hours a week at each given period.
Forty-five hours is the cut-off point used by the Central Statistical Office
in labour force surveys. This is in line with section 18 (2) of the SI 244
of 1999 (Collective Bargaining Agreement) for the construction industry,
which stipulates that subject to exemptions, ordinary hours of work for
all employees shall not exceed 44 hours per week (GoZ, 1999). Table 4.6 is
based on adjustments of CSO data representing the proportion of workers
doing more than 45 hours a week, with the assumption that the national
figures apply to the construction sector. The most accurate data on this was
compiled for the 1999 survey, which revealed that 44% of the working-
age population worked over 45 hours per week, while 38% worked more
than 48 hours per week11. Although hours of work for women in the wage
sector were recorded at 35.3%, compared to men at 51.7%, women’s hours
of work are much higher when both domestic and informal economy work
are considered.
Table 4.6 Hours of work
1990 2000
Hours of work in all sectors at the national level n/a 44
Source: CSO (2000) 1999 Indicator Monitoring Labour Force Survey.
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Box 4.2 More than hours of work
At its peak and even as recently as 2002/2003, Belmont Construc-
tion (Pvt) Ltd employed between 500 and 600 workers at a time. With
punitive interest rates and inflation after 2003, like many other firms,
Belmont could not afford to continue operating. It has retained only
a skeletal staff, stopped construction work and moved into equipment
hire. To support its few workers, it provides one meal a day on site as
well as transport for employees not working at central sites.
Interview with Edmund Zerf, Director of Belmont Construction, 11
April 2006.
With the collapse of the formal employment economy and the rapid
growth of informal or self-employment, several changes have taken place.
Employers and employees have agreed to reduce the number of working
hours or work longer hours without overtime pay (or with no pay at all) in
order to maintain operations and avoid closing down firms. Thus, in some
cases hours of work have decreased while in others they have increased.
The CSO (2000: 80) reports that up to 95% of workers preferred to work an
extra two hours without being paid overtime in order to keep their jobs.
On the basis of hours worked in the formal sector and extra informal work
done in the evening and at weekends, it can be assumed that over 50% of
workers now work more than 50 hours a week across all industries.
The cost of going to work or keeping operations going has increased
since 2000. This has forced many construction companies to stop operating
and has sent employees into the informal economy or self-employment,
where they are likely to work longer hours than usual. The figures in
Table 4.6 are estimates based on the assumption that since 2000, workers
have had to work longer hours to maintain their minimum wage. See also
Box 4.2.
Health and safety at work
The major source of data on health and safety at work is compiled by the
National Social Security Authority (NSSA) and is based largely on submis-
sions from employers, employer organizations, field inspections and new
workers’ compensation claims made under the 1990 Workers’ Compensa-
tion Scheme, Statutory Instrument 68. NSSA statistics pertain to injuries
and fatalities that occur in a particular year (for preventive purposes),
although year of occurrence is hard to define for occupational diseases
(NSSA, 2000: 5). The Central Statistical Office (CSO) also depends on NSSA
statistics for its own publications. The records give details on reported oc-
cupational injuries by sector and region according to type of injury.
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Table 4.7 Health and safety at work
1996 2000
Days lost due to injury in the workplace per 1000 wage earners in all sectors
at the national level
53.3 28.7
Days lost due to injury in the workplace per 1000 wage earners in all sectors
in Bulawayo
6.7 47.5
Days lost due to injury in the workplace per 1000 wage earners in the con-
struction sector at the national level
57.3 26.0
Days lost due to injury in the workplace per 1000 wage earners in the con-
struction sector in Bulawayo
111.0 66.8
Sources: Compiled from NSSA figures April 2006 and CSO Indicator Monitoring Labour Force Survey
and Labour Statistics (1994, 1999).
Neither the NSSA nor the CSO have any interest in collecting data on the
number of hours of work lost to the economy due to occupational injuries
or death. The NSSA only came into existence in 1994 and started collecting
comprehensive statistics in 1995. Therefore, for Zimbabwe a comprehen-
sive picture on safety at work can only be gleaned for the past decade or
so. Key indicators from the data include total injuries per year, incidence
rate and frequency rate, calculated per thousand insured labour force. The
insured labour force is the number of workers registered with the NSSA
for social security purposes. This is compulsory for all workers, except
peasant agricultural workers, domestic servants and those in the informal
sector. So theoretically, all workers in the formal sector are insured work-
ers. The NSSA figures do not include civil servants.
Table 4.7 provides a summary of the number of hours lost to the econ-
omy due to occupational injuries, providing both a conservative and high
estimate. How these figures were calculated and why the pattern of im-
proving conditions may actually be the opposite of what happens in the
economy needs further explanation. The input needed for this are figures
on reported injuries, total number of the insured labour force and inci-
dence rates. The occupational injuries figures were used together with the
number of insured labour force to calculate the incidence rate, that is, the
number of occupational injuries per thousand workers. The incidence rate
was multiplied by three (the minimum number of days away from work
for an injury to be recorded) to give a low estimate of the days lost to the
economy.
NSSA figures for the 1995–1998 period show that since the mid-1990s,
there have been a growing number of occupational injuries in the work-
place. Any injury that does not result in absence from work or less than
three days away from work is not recorded for the purposes of NSSA
monitoring. This means that many other injuries in the workplace never
get recorded. The NSSA (2000: 6) states that reported occupational injuries
underestimate the extent of the problem due to the fact that:
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Table 4.8 Reported occupational injuries in the building and construction sector
1996 2000 2005
Occupational injuries in all sectors at the national level 20,330 14,507 8290
Occupational injuries in all sectors at city level, Bulawayo 447 3949 2391
Occupational injuries in the construction sector at national level 1578 926 366
Occupational injuries in the construction sector at the city level, Bulawayo 414 353 135
Source: National Social Security Authority (NSSA), April 2006.
 Occupational injuries to the self-employed are excluded, given that
most workers in the informal economy are not covered under the
workers compensation scheme.
 Cases occurring away from the workplace or on a journey to and from
work are not included.
The NSSA also runs the Bulawayo Rehabilitation Centre for workers in-
jured in the workplace. Workers are detained for 45.5 days on average at
the Bulawayo Rehabilitation Centre. Clearly, such workers are those with
serious injuries and are not the majority. According to key informants,
there is underreporting of injuries at work and the true figure could be as
much as five times the reported figure. Key informants also claim that with
the foreign currency shortages, sourcing spare parts and equipment has
become a serious problem, forcing companies to recycle old components
and taking other risky measures that compromise safety in the workplace.
The reported occupational injuries in Table 4.8 can be used together with
the number of insured labour force in Table 4.9 to calculate the incidence
rate, that is, the number of occupational injuries per thousand workers
(Table 4.10).
Recent legal changes on health and safety at work
As provided in the Factories and Works Act (1976) (GoZ, 1976) employ-
ers are legally bound to provide NSSA officers with access to companies
and workplaces and to forward to NSSA records of occupational injuries.
NSSA officers are authorized to issue prohibition orders to any offending
employers or on sites where standards are not met.
Table 4.9 Insured labour force and the construction sector
1996 2000 2005
Insured workers in all sectors at the national level 1,143,324 1,517,657 1,744,267
Insured workers in all sectors at city level, Bulawayo 199,335 249,287 285,545
Insured workers in the construction sector at national level 82,662 106,954 114,900
Insured workers in the construction sector at the city level,
Bulawayo
11,194 15,845 17,526
Source: National Social Security Authority (NSSA) data, April 2006 (see also Annual Report, 2001:
109).
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Table 4.10 Incidence rate: occupational injuries in the building and construction sector
1996 2000 2005
Incidence rate in all sectors at the national level 17.8 9.2 4.8
Incidence rate in all sectors at city level, Bulawayo 2.2 15.8 8.4
Incidence rate in the construction sector at national level 19.1 8.7 3.2
Incidence rate in the construction sector at the city level, Bulawayo 37.0 22.3 7.7
Sources: National Social Security Authority (NSSA) data and Labour Survey Statistics 2006.
In contrast, although worker representatives at the shop-floor level and
ZCTU health and safety officers can inspect sites and make records of oc-
cupational injuries or diseases, they cannot issue prohibition orders and
can only make recommendations to both employers and the NSSA. These
recommendations can be ignored. See Box 4.3.
While basic metal products, the mining and quarrying sector, agricul-
ture and forestry have the highest reported occupational injuries, building
and construction is one of the top five, with high occupational accidents
in relation to the number of workers. It must be stressed that there is no
recording of workplace injury and disease statistics in the peasant and in-
formal sectors. Only a focused time series study can shed light on inci-
dence rates and hours lost to the economy in these sectors of the economy.
The magnitude of occupational injuries in Zimbabwe remains hugely un-
der reported.
4.3.2 Social security indicators
Public social security coverage
If only formally employed persons of the working age population are
considered, there is 100% insurance against risks of injury at work,
Box 4.3 Statistics on the insured labour force
NSSA advises that until recently, insured labour force data was ob-
tained from the Workers Compensation Insurance Fund (WCIF). This
data has been inconsistent and inaccurate. Since the population cov-
ered by the National Pension Scheme (NPS) is ideally the same as that
covered by the WCIF, the NSSA uses the NPS data on insured labour
force, and this appears to be more consistent. This means that there
has been an increase in the insured labour force by sector, so the inci-
dence rates calculated based on this denominator tend to be lower than
in previous years. This fact should be borne in mind when comparing
rates (NSSA, 2000: 4).
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Table 4.11 Public social security coverage rate1
1990 2000
Social security coverage rate in all sectors at the national level n/a 15
Sources: National Social Security Authority (NSSA) 2006 and the Census 2002
National Report (CSO, 2002).
1 Legally, all formal workers must be covered by the Public Social Security System.
unemployment, sick leave, etc. This is the basis of the figures in Table 4.11.
However, we consider that only 15% of the working-age population is in
formal employment, so social security coverage at the national level is also
15%. There is no quantitative information to incorporate coverage of the
informal sector.
For a more complete view of social security at the national level, more
information is needed. Until 1994, Zimbabwe did not have a comprehen-
sive public social security scheme. The Ministry of Public Service and So-
cial Welfare operated the Workers’ Compensation Scheme (WCIF). In 1994,
the Government set up the National Social Security Authority (NSSA) to
administer the WCIF in parallel with other forms of social security. This
was largely the National Pension Scheme, or Pension and Other Bene-
fits Scheme (NPS). Both the WCIF and the NPS cover all workers, except
those in the civil service, security services, domestic workers, informal sec-
tor workers and peasant farmers. The economic decline since 2000 has
delayed the setting up of new schemes to cover these workers and the
planned National Health Scheme.
Since colonial days, there has been an assumption that the majority of
black Zimbabwean workers and peasant farmers have rural communal
land rights as their main form of social security. For this reason, the no-
tions of labour rights, urban citizenship and land have been tightly in-
tertwined. But as argued elsewhere, for many urban workers communal
land rights are not about production only but other cultural and religious
needs as well (Mbiba, 1999). Productive agricultural lands, and the sup-
plies needed to make land productive, are in short supply or beyond the
reach of most poor workers. In addition, a significant urban population
now has no desire to access rural land rights, which the state maintains as
a framework for social sanction and control (Mbiba, 2001).
Notwithstanding the above, we have to recognize the existence of com-
munal land rights and other forms of traditional social security or social
safety nets (GoZ, 2005c: 21) used by the majority of black Zimbabweans.
These include access to land rights in rural areas, family networks and
community support. The Government has tried to re-invigorate some of
these through Zunde Ramambo – a food security scheme managed by tra-
ditional chiefs. While these may not be directly available to urban poor,
it should be noted that black Zimbabweans are very mobile, with family
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members switching between urban and rural residence as part of survival
and accumulation. The question of land (both rural and urban) is inte-
grated into this complex web of relations.
Beyond the NPS and WCIF, there are private and occupational insurance
and pension schemes at industry and sector levels, such as the mining
industry, railways, electricity and local government. The NSSA National
Pensions Scheme (NPS) was designed to be a basic system complemented
with individual savings, personal insurances and company-level occupa-
tional pension schemes. From its inception in 1994, the insurable earnings
under the NPS was set at a ceiling of $Z4000 and remained at that level un-
til 2001 (NSSA Annual Report, 2001: 7), when it was raised to Z$7000. With
hyperinflation in the country since the late 1990s, the value of this benefit
has been severely eroded, even with the subsequent reviews that raised
monthly payments to Z$252,000 by 2006 (The Herald, Wednesday 3 May
2006). Further reviews were anticipated, but would not make a difference
in an inflationary environment.
Both the NPS and the WCIF are dependent on the cooperation of em-
ployers, who must register with the NSSA, collect contributions and for-
ward these to the NSSA every month. There are problems in the imple-
mentation of all three of these steps. Zimbabwe has no single employer
data base and this compounds monitoring problems for the NSSA. In 2001,
amendments were made to the NSSA Act to give inspectors the power to
enter and search premises, inspect employers’ records and returns, and
enforce collections and contributions.
NSSA offices are concentrated in main urban centres and people in re-
mote or rural regions have to travel long distances to submit claims or
make inquiries. This factor means that there are more workers who do not
have adequate access to national social security.
The money collected by NSSA is not just to be paid out as benefits in
the short term but is to be invested as well. For years, workers and labour
unions have demanded that some of this be invested in urban housing for
workers but NSSA has been slow to implement a comprehensive hous-
ing programme. The bulk of inflows to NSSA are channelled to invest-
ments such as equities, prescribed markets, money market and real estate
(NSSA, 2001: 27). In turn, return from investments accounts for the bulk of
inflows to NSSA, with employers and employees making an almost equal
contribution.
Old age pension
The old-age pension coverage rate is calculated by measuring the pro-
portion of people aged sixty-five or over without pension coverage at the
given dates and sectors respectively. Figures for the population aged sixty-
five years and over can be obtained from national census reports, while
the pension coverage can be obtained from the NSSA. However, the NSSA
P1: SFK/UKS P2: SFK/UKS QC: SFK/UKS T1: SFK
BLBK177-Werna May 30, 2009 16:13
Bulawayo 111
enumeration framework does not correspond to the one used by the cen-
sus office for practical reasons, leaving us with no credible data on pension
coverage.
In the 2002 census, for example, the number of people 65 years and over
was recorded as being 3.55% (215,842) for the nation as a whole and 2.54%
(17,196) for the Bulawayo region, that is, 2.5% of Bulawayo’s population
was 65 years old or over. However, when it comes to the NSSA figures
on pensions, the national figure was 183,184 and 26,933 for Bulawayo.
The figure for those receiving pensions in Bulawayo is greater than the
recorded census figure. This does not mean that everyone aged 65 years
and over in Bulawayo has a pension. The discrepancy arises from the fact
that the NSSA keeps all those whose pension addresses are in Bulawayo
on its books, even if they no longer reside there. Many of these may have
migrated back to rural areas, where the cost of living is lower, but they
are still able to collect their pensions from banks or travel occasionally to
Bulawayo.
In the formal sector at the national level, only about 15% of those aged
65 years and over are not covered by an old age pension. This figure is too
low because it underestimates the number of those not covered, largely
because the NSSA figures include a large proportion of pensioners (often
white Zimbabweans) still on its records but now living outside Zimbabwe
in South Africa, Australia, New Zealand or the UK. This scenario indicates
that with the existing statistics, it may be very misleading to attempt a cal-
culation of pension coverage by region and sector. A further point is that
NSSA pension statistics do not cover the civil service and state security
personnel (army, police, prisons and airforce). The director of state pen-
sions refused to release any of these statistics ‘for security reasons’. All
civil servants are covered by a public sector pension.
4.3.3 Indicators of workers’ rights
Legislation on workers’ rights and working conditions
Through the pro-worker 1985 Labour Relations Act (No. 16), an improve-
ment to the 1984 Employment Act, rights were conferred on workers in
areas of job security and freedom of association for African workers in
line with aspirations of the nationalist movement, which had contributed
significantly to the independence movement. This pro-worker statute fol-
lowed hundreds of labour protests and strikes between 1980 and 1985 be-
cause of high worker expectations soon after independence. While it pro-
vided for improved worker rights in an attempt to meet ILO standards, its
main weakness was the failure to harmonize labour relations laws; it left
out civil servants generally. It also excluded senior local authority work-
ers, whose conditions of work would be governed by the Urban Councils
Act.
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The second phase of challenges came around the late 1980s and early
1990s with the introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment Pro-
gramme (ESAP). Even before the program was formally pronounced, stag-
nation had set in as the Government grappled with economic problems
and sought dialogue with national and global capital. The latter argued
that the 1985 Act was too worker-friendly, rigid and a disincentive for in-
vestors (e.g. in terms of minimum wages and price controls). The private
sector also argued that the law did not allow employers to hire and fire
workers and that it gave Government too much room to interfere in in-
dustrial employer-worker relations.
With ESAP in 1991, the Government basically gave in to private sec-
tor demands and came up with the 1992 Labour Relations Amendment
Act (No. 17). As the passing of the Act became imminent, confronta-
tion between Government and workers intensified, with historical protest
marches in July 1992 in Harare. This marked the divorce between the
labour movement and the Government in post-colonial Zimbabwe. The
then Minister of Labour, John Nkomo, responded to the protests by retort-
ing that workers and the ZCTU were neither Government nor a political
party, but that if they wanted to become one then they were free to do so.
Minister Nkomo was indirectly inviting ZCTU to form a political party12 –
an invitation repeated by President Mugabe a few years later. These socio-
legal changes set the context for the detailed discussions which are out-
lined in the remainder of this chapter.
Wage inequality between genders
By the late 1980s, Zimbabwe women had made strong progress in many
fields, particularly education and health care (GoZ/USAID, 1996). How-
ever, women have not fared well in the economy and remained under-
represented in formal employment and access to land. Commercial and in-
dustrial opportunities remain beyond the reach of the majority of women.
In a detailed study of 18,800 low-income households participating in GoZ
housing programs funded by USAID (GoZ/USAID, 1996), it was shown
that only 6% of the beneficiary households were female headed, even
though up to 20% of urban households were female headed in the 1980s.
While the legal instruments have been changed to enhance women’s ad-
vancement, many gender barriers associated with Zimbabwe’s patriarchal
society remain. Women face harassment and logistical problems when
they seek to assert their rights.
Traditionally, women are responsible for significant aspects of the house
construction process. They also constitute up to 70% of those working
in the informal sector generally. However, when it comes to construc-
tion in urban areas, the technical nature of the process and the gender
barriers make it difficult for women to participate. For example, during
house construction, women are faced with delays in obtaining building
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Table 4.12 Earnings inequalities between men and women of working age
Women Men
Work done (national level) 54.6% 76.9%
Income bracket ≤ Z$500 29.0% 19.1%
Earning ≥ Z$3000 7.7% 17.7%
Construction Sector
No work done 43.3% 11.9%
Work done 56.7% 88.1%
Income bracket ≤ Z$500 15.6% 18.7%
Earning ≥ Z$3000 12.1% 17.7%
Median wage Z$ (national economy) 250 (250)1 620 (1999)1
Median wage Z$ (construction sector) 250 (874)1 1249 (1249)1
Source: figures modified from CSO (2000) 1999 Indicator Monitoring Labour Force
Survey, Harare, pp. 77–79.
1 The figure in brackets is the median earnings calculated for those who had done work
only, i.e. excluding the ‘no work done’ category.
materials from providers, especially during times of shortage when ma-
terials are very expensive. Where women have to travel long distances
or queue to get materials, they have problems concerning childcare
and other domestic responsibilities and are subject to sexual harassment
(GoZ/USAID, 1996: iv).
In summary, the majority of women have remained outside the formal
employment sector and their presence in cities was restricted by colonial
apartheid laws until independence in 1980. Unfortunately, this perception
of women from the colonial era remains; hence the limited progress, de-
spite laws against discrimination on the basis of gender, race or religion.
Table 4.12 is based on the 1999 labour force survey and shows 45.4% of
women have never ‘worked’, compared to 23.1% of men. This refers to
paid work and is misleading, given that women do a lot of domestic and
community work that is neither recorded nor directly remunerated. In ru-
ral areas remuneration for agricultural work is usually recorded under the
name of the male spouses. According to the CSO (2004), employment rates
in 1982 were 71.4 for men, compared to 42.9 for women, changing to 60.6
and 36.7 in 1992, and 73.0 and 62.0 in 1999 respectively13. Table 4.12 also
shows that nationally, more women earn low incomes than men, with 29%
of women in the lowest income category of under $Z500, compared to
19.1% for men. At the top end, 17.7% of men earned incomes in the high-
est bracket of Z$3000 and above, compared to 7.7% for women. Published
labour statistics for 1990–1995 are not available to allow a presentation of
trends. However, the 1999 labour force survey does give a picture of the
gender inequalities in the construction sector where the work patterns are
similar to those at the national level.
However, in the construction sector the income gap between men
and women is narrower than at the national level. We assume that the
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construction sector figures are similar to those for the city level, where
no published figures are provided in labour force surveys. Based on the
median incomes for 1999–2000, at the national level men earned as much
as eight times more than women. In the construction sector men earned
about one and half times more than women. The bulk of low-paid work-
ers (mainly women and children) are in the agricultural sector, such that
if this is factored out of the national figures, the gap between the national
median wage for women and men would be closer to that for the construc-
tion sector. In summary, although the Labour Relations Act 5 (1) protects
employees against discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, tribe, place
of origin and political opinion, Table 4.12 shows that in practice inequali-
ties persist.
Wage inequality based on workers’ places of birth
Places of birth for workers range from rural areas and other cities within
the country, as well as abroad. CSO (2004) states that economically active
immigrants from outside Zimbabwe have declined from a peak of 1826 in
1985 to 1087 in 1990, 647 in 2000 and 394 in 2002. Between 1990 and 2000
the highest numbers of male immigrants were architects and engineers,
while most female immigrants were teachers. These CSO figures do not
cover illegal immigrants, most of whom would find work in the agricul-
ture and informal sectors. Although labour force surveys and the censuses
give figures on foreign-born residents, there are no published statistics on
income differences between workers’ places of birth. However, consider-
ing that incomes in the agriculture sector are lower than in the rest of the
economy, it is tempting to assume that workers in the construction sector
in Bulawayo earn more than in their rural places of birth. This may not be
the case, however, if we were to give a monetary value to all rural work
and associated benefits.
Child labour
Prior to the 1999 Indicator Monitoring Labour Force Survey, information
on child labour was scarce (CSO, 2004: 56). Children are defined as those
less than fifteen years of age (CSO, 2001: 45), although for working chil-
dren data, labour statistics CSO (2004) define children as those of five to
seventeen years of age. Children do participate in active work, particularly
in the agricultural, forestry and fishing sectors (87% of all working chil-
dren in 1999), and the service sectors (10% of all working children in 1999).
The CSO (2004: 56) indicates that in 1992, 3% of the 1,457,000 work-
ing children aged ten to fourteen years were largely unpaid family work-
ers. The proportion working in the construction sector is negligible, at
about 1.7% of all working children in 1999 (CSO, 2004: 59). For the whole
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economy in 1999, the CSO (2000: 51) reported that 8% of the 4,226,693
working children aged five to seventeen were employed largely as unpaid
family workers (5%). These figures on child labour illustrate once again the
inconsistency in definitions and frameworks used in official documents, in
this case figures for children switch from ten to fourteen, to five to seven-
teen, to five to fourteen.
4.3.4 Indicators of social dialogue
Legislation on social dialogue
In terms of the Labour Relations Act (1996), all workers have the right to
belong to a union and to form and participate in workers’ committees.
This section pays specific attention to the conditions of social dialogue
and the legislative changes that have taken place since the 1980s. Strictly
speaking, Bulawayo City has played a marginal role in this area, largely
due to the legal and institutional framework that defines relations in this
area of decent work. It is central government, employers, unions and the
National Employment Council (NEC) that are central to deliberations on
this issue where contradictions remain. Although the legal framework and
conditions on paper have improved significantly since the 1980s, in prac-
tice some of these gains in the labour sphere are compromised by recent
economic decline and overriding security laws.
Key informants agreed unanimously that legal and statutory provisions
for workers’ rights and social dialogue have improved immensely over the
last decade and are better than before. However, in practice there are short-
comings and often reversals in areas relating to civil servants, the informal
sector, contract or casual labourers (who make up to 95% of workers in
some firms in the construction sector), domestic servants and women. The
key constraint is the declining economy. This has heightened political ten-
sions in the country, leading to an atmosphere of a ‘state of emergency’
where, in the ‘interests of state security’, the Government has introduced
measures reversing gains in social dialogue and workers rights. Key in-
formants cited the implementation of POSA and AIIPA as the most dam-
aging, even though on paper these statutes may appear beneficial to the
nation.
At independence in 1980, the country had to transform from the inher-
ited dual legal system to a unitary one and do away with racially inspired
labour laws such as the Masters and Servants Act, under which African
workers were not considered as employees. Key informants reflected with
nostalgia on the early days in the 1980s when the ruling ZANU (PF) and its
key members, such as then Minister of Labour, Kumbirai Kangai, with his
philosophy of ‘one industry one union’, championed the cause of work-
ers and harmonized the fragmented unions into a formidable Zimbabwe
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU).
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A Bulawayo-based trade unionist considers that the 1992 Amendment
Act caused splintering of workers’ activities, increased or created bureau-
cracy, disempowered trade unions and was a marked return to labour
colonialism; a ‘return to Master and Servants’ through the back door.
Through the SI of 1992, cited as the Retrenchment Regulations, (replacing
SI 4040 of 1990) and in pursuit of ESAP policy, firms could now retrench
workers more easily (the dreaded chigumura)14, as opposed to the situa-
tion in early 1986. The right to strike was curtailed, making it illegal for
workers to go on strike without permission; and workers are of the view
that permission is impossible to get. Furthermore, export promotion zones
(EPZ), the EPZ Act (Chap. 56) exclusively and explicitly prohibited the ap-
plication of the Labour Act in these zones. Bulawayo has one such zone,
which remains undeveloped.
The massive deregulation of the economy – leading to company clo-
sures (e.g. Cone Textiles, National Blankets in Bulawayo) and massive re-
trenchments – impoverished workers and reduced their bargaining power
at the shop-floor level. There was a rise in contract working. At the na-
tional economy level, the budget deficit along with both foreign and do-
mestic debt increased. Both Government and workers found themselves
under pressure and, while the Government relaxed laws for employ-
ers, it toughened laws for workers, who were left with little room for
manoeuvre. Strikes and public demonstrations became the order of the
day, including the landmark countrywide strike by civil servants in Au-
gust 1996 and City Hall demonstrations in Bulawayo in 1997. Workers
staged a series of job stay-aways from 1997–2000, activities that para-
lyzed industry and effectively reasserted the labour movement as a crit-
ical player in the national political economy at a time when civil organi-
zations and other traditional allies of the ruling party (such as war vet-
erans and students) were also challenging ZANU (PF) legitimacy and
domination.
In line with ILO provisions, the Zimbabwe Government introduced tri-
partite negotiating in 1998 to bring together Government, workers and
employers in a bid to create a harmonious economic environment in the
country. Workers are represented by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade
Unions (ZCTU) although the political climate has seen efforts to put up a
competitor union. At industry level, and in line with the Labour Relations
Act, workers are represented by their Zimbabwe Construction and Allied
Trades Workers Union (ZCATWU). Employers have to set up and regis-
ter a National Economic Council and Collective Bargaining Agreement,
both lodged with the Government. Employers and employees agree on
wages and working conditions via the NEC and the CBA process. Employ-
ers are represented by members from the larger firms in the Construction
Industry Federation of Zimbabwe and those from the Zimbabwe Build-
ing and Construction Association (ZBCA). All have regional offices in
Bulawayo.
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Table 4.13 Union density rate
1992 2000
Union density all sectors at the national level 16 13
Source: Union representatives.
NB Union numbers include only those affiliated with the National Zimbabwe Congress
of Trade Unions at the time of recording.
Union density rate
According to figures from the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
(ZCTU) Information Department, total union membership was about
200,000 in 1990. This declined to 141,560 in 1995 and rose again to 165,012
in 2000 and 228,430 in 2005. This rise is also reflected in the construction
sector, with membership at 3000 in 1998, up to 3700 in 2000 and 4800 in
2005. At the Bulawayo City level, membership rose from 500 to 750 and
1200 respectively15. Union membership and CSO figures on employed
workers were used to calculate union coverage and density indicators,
given in Table 4.13. However, these should be considered as very conser-
vative. First, the original figures only cover returns from unions affiliated
with the ZCTU based on paid-up membership16. This membership tends
to be very high in an election year when unionists mobilize potential vot-
ers, as opposed to other years. Second, the original figures on total employ-
ees by industry sector at national level include civil servants not affiliated
with the ZCTU. If civil servants were excluded from the employee totals,
the overall union density would be much higher.
Schiphorst (2001: 229) asserts that, with the exception of the mining in-
dustry, trade unions in Zimbabwe are geographically organized and do
not have a structural presence at the shop-floor level. Unions’ capacity to
organize and take collective job action has been restricted both before and
after independence, although since 1985 the Labour Relations Act has in-
corporated the right to strike, except for those sectors considered ‘essential
services’. Union membership appears to have taken a fall during the mid-
1990s, when many workers lost their jobs due to retrenchments as part of
the economic structural adjustment policy. More precisely, 14,000 workers
lost their jobs in 1993 alone (CSO, 2004: 26).
Collective bargaining
While the continuous collective bargaining process seems to be going well,
agreements are not always easy to achieve and workers do go on strike.
There are limits, however, on how much workers can use this collective
action to express dissatisfaction. Without permission from the Govern-
ment and the police and where action is deemed to be a political or secu-
rity threat, strikes and demonstrations will be prohibited, often forcefully.
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When agreement failed during the 2004 negotiations between the coun-
cil and its workers, council workers resolved to demonstrate at City Hall,
Bulawayo. Declared unlawful by the police, the demonstration was force-
fully disbanded with reported injuries and deaths as a result (ZUCWU,
2006: 3). Labour unions allege that AIPPA and POSA make it possible
to restrict social dialogue activities that would ordinarily be permissible
under the Labour Relations Act.
At the regional level, the construction workers’ union in Bulawayo is
bound by agreements reached at the national level through both the TNF
and CBA process. It is worth noting that when the Government raised fuel
prices unilaterally in 2003, labour (ZCTU) felt the Government was not
treating it with respect as a social partner and the national TNF collapsed.
The dialogue resumed in early 2005. Other areas of national governance
in which the ZCTU would like a greater say include the National AIDS
Council (NAC) and the NSSA, given the contribution that workers make
to these organizations. Unhappy with the management of NSSA, labour
withdrew its representative on the NSSA board and the situation remained
unchanged two years later.
Both the NEC for the construction sector and the workers union in Bul-
awayo are poorly equipped and technical expertise is overstretched, leav-
ing no room for strategic work. Neither office saw any need or space
for the local authority in promoting conditions of work and argued, as
did the local authority, that conditions are set nationally and the only is-
sues at the local level are about implementation. An area of concern for
both the NEC and the local authority is the employment of unregistered
contractors. Contractors may be registered as legitimate companies with
the NEC but not with the contractor/employer organizations, ZBCA and
CIFOZ, which set and monitor professional standards among their mem-
bers. Ideally, the local authority should give contracts only to those mem-
bers registered with both the NEC and ZBCA or CIFOZ – this appears not
to happen all the time.
While the NEC is supposed to police, and has authority to charge un-
registered builders and contractors, its ability to do so is limited by man-
power. Field interviews with bricklayers revealed that informal builders
previously registered with the NEC have defaulted but can still get con-
struction jobs. The NEC has no resources to inspect sites, while contractors
have devised ways of avoiding detection.
4.3.5 Workers’ rights and social dialogue in Zimbabwe
The Government’s response to worker agitation in the 1990s included
passing the 1998 SI 368 (Anti Stay-away Regulations), the 2002 Labour Re-
lations Amendment No. 17, the 2003 Amendment 7 and the 2001 Criminal
Penalties Amendment Act. The latter criminalized labour misconducts.
For example, it made it possible to prosecute those calling for a strike
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(section 104 and section 107) and enabled employers to bring workers be-
fore a court of law and to demand they pay compensation for loss of pro-
duction as a result of strike action, including lawful strike action. Other
key operational legislation on working conditions includes the SI 244 of
1999, as supported by the Labour Act 28: 01, No. 17 of 2002 and No. 7 of
2005. Section 3 of Act No. 7 of 2005 brings together the public and private
sectors, as well as those working in the export processing zones, previ-
ously excluded from this act. Salaries and other conditions are negotiated
through a continuous process as per the collective bargaining agreements
in the industry.
However, Mucheche (2005b: 3) explains that even with the 2005 amend-
ments, workers in the armed forces, prisons and police remain excluded.
He argues that civil servants are deprived of full rights to collective bar-
gaining, the right to strike and access to proper and efficient dispute
resolution mechanisms. Civil servants can still be unfairly transferred
without notice or consultation, leading to the separation of spouses; a sep-
aration that increases the risks of HIV/AIDS among heterosexual couples
in Zimbabwe. Yet, as confirmed by the Supreme Court, civil servants have
a right to be consulted before transfer17.
Workers in the construction sector, through the Construction and Allied
Trades Workers Union and the ZCTU, consider that their continued strug-
gles from the 1990s have led to some positive changes in 2003 in the le-
gal provisions for workers countrywide, particularly in the context of the
2002 Labour Relations Amendment Act No. 17. According to ZCATWU
and ZCTU, these positive changes include:
 Protection from unfair dismissal: every worker has a right to not be
unfairly dismissed.
 Right to strike: strikes are allowed in non-essential services and pick-
eting is now allowed.
 Trade union superiority over workers’ committees: where a registered
trade union represents the interests of not less than half of the employ-
ees at the workplace where a workers’ committee is to be established,
every member of the workers committee shall be a member of the trade
union concerned.
 Empowerment of workers council: that is, the managerial preroga-
tive is diluted through employee participation in decision making. An
employer can consult a workers’ council regarding proposals relating
to restructuring of the workplace following technological change and
work methods, product development plans, job grading and training
and education schemes affecting employees, partial or total plant clo-
sures, mergers and transfers of ownership, the implementation of an
employment code of conduct, the criteria for merit for pay increases
or discretionary bonuses, and the retrenchment of voluntary or tem-
porary workers.
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 Casual and contract work: there is new employment security for con-
tract workers. A contract of employment that does not specify its dura-
tion or date of termination, other than a contract for casual or seasonal
work or for some specific service, shall be deemed a contract without
limit of time.
 Sick leave: this has been extended from one month to six, of which
three months are on full pay and the other three on half pay, before the
contract of employment can be terminated.
 Vacation leave: paid vacation leave has been extended from an average
of 18 days to 30 days each year. Thus, since the 1990s, leave days have
gone from 1.5 days a month to an average of 2.5 days a month.
 Maternity leave is granted for 90 days on full pay (up from 45 days).
The other conditions remain the same.
 Notice of termination of a contract of employment by either party is
now three months for contracts without limit of time (permanent) and
contracts for a period exceeding two years; two months for contracts
for a period exceeding one year but less than two years; one month for
contracts for a period exceeding six months but less than one year; and
two weeks for contracts for a period of six months or less and casual
or seasonal work.
 Special leave on full pay is given to an employee for the following
reasons:
◦ On the instruction of a medical practitioner because of contact with
an infectious disease
◦ When required to attend court in Zimbabwe as a witness
◦ When required to attend a meeting as a delegate or office bearer of
a registered trade union representing employees within the under-
taking or industry in which the employee is employed
◦ When detained for questioning by the police
◦ On the death of a spouse, parent, child or legal dependant
◦ On any justifiable compassionate grounds
This special leave is limited to 12 days in a calendar year.
 Discrimination based on gender, HIV/AIDS status or disability is now
prohibited.
However, as noted by several commentators, while positive, the legal pro-
visions in these amendments fall short of the needs of some categories
of workers and face several obstacles. The biggest enemy is inflation
(ZUCWU, Bulawayo, 2006). Since 2000, legal provisions and employers
have made efforts to provide extra support such as grants for burial or fu-
nerals, soap for washing uniforms or overalls, travel allowances or trans-
port to and from construction sites and central collection points in the city,
and the provision of meals at work, as reported by key informants and
respondents in Bulawayo18. Workers remain concerned with deterioration
in health and safety at work as the economy finds it difficult to mobilize
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foreign currency and purchase needed spare parts. Observations of build-
ings in both Harare and Bulawayo show that on average only one-quarter
to one-fifth of the elevators will be working on any given day. Some of
the lifts in older buildings require total replacement and this costs 18 to
21 billion dollars for one lift, plus another 21 million per month to service
the lift19.
Construction sector workers have further specific social security con-
cerns regarding the 65 years age at which benefits can be paid. Yet, accord-
ing to both workers and employers in Bulawayo, construction workers
hardly survive beyond 45 years and, under current conditions, by the time
any of them get to 65 the pension benefits will be insignificant.
According to the ZCATU, while the average week for construction
workers is 44 hours, they need to have this reduced to 42, but working
this out for guards and casual workers remains problematic. When work-
ers are injured, they claim there are unfair practices in the determination
of the degree of injury (and hence compensation) and in job security for
injured and casual workers. Respondents suggested that professional as-
sessment by doctors representing the workers should also be taken into
account in addition to those made by NSSA-appointed doctors. While the
rehabilitation centre in Bulawayo is a good facility, it may be useful to have
more such facilities, at least another centre, perhaps in Harare.
The construction sector remains a ‘out of bounds’ for women, both as
workers and employers, with only about 12 women currently members
of CIFOZ/ZBCA. While maternity conditions have improved with the
Labour Relations Amendments (2003), further changes are needed, such
as work suits for women, instead of overalls, and separate toilets (together
with all related facilities), even if there is only one woman at the con-
struction site. The greatest scourge in the workplace for women in the
construction industry is sexual harassment. Harassment needs to be de-
fined in the construction context in order to protect women (F. Mugabe).
Women would welcome support in this area from others and the sharing
of global experiences on ways of improving both regulations and manage-
ment practice. Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy remains an issue
in the sector and, despite the general legislative improvements on mater-
nity and sick leave, Zimbabwe remains behind its neighbour South Africa
in this area (Mucheche, 2005a).
4.3.6 Synthesis: decent work indicators in Bulawayo
Table 4.14 presents the decent work indicators for Zimbabwe and Bul-
awayo according to the four key components. The right hand column of
this table shows trends towards (positive) or away from (negative) decent
work for each of the indicators in all sectors and in the construction sector
at the national and local levels.
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Table 4.14 Bulawayo decent work indicators
Employment dimension
Unemployment rate
1990 2000 Trend towards DW
National level All sectors 11% 9% +ve
Local level All sectors 16% 17% −ve
Low wage rate
1990 2000 Trend towards DW
National level All sectors n/a 25%
Construction n/a 33%
Hours of work
1990 2000 Trend towards DW
National level All sectors n/a 44%
Social security dimension
Public social security coverage
1990 2000 Trend towards DW
National level All sectors n/a 46%
Old age pension
1990 2002 Trend towards DW
National level All sectors n/a 3.55%
Local level All sectors n/a 2.54%
Workers’ rights dimension
Wage inequality between genders
1990 2000 Trend towards DW
National level All sectors
Construction
Child labour
1992 (10–14) 1999 (5–17) Trend towards DW
National level All sectors 3% 8% −ve
Construction n/a 1.7%
Social dialogue dimension
Union density rate
1992 2000 Trend towards DW
National level All sectors 16% 13% −ve
4.4 Decent work in Bulawayo: initiatives and evidence
4.4.1 Equality and the indigenization policy in the construction sector
At the time independence was gained in 1980, the construction indus-
try was dominated and controlled by members of the Construction In-
dustry Federation of Zimbabwe (CIFOZ) whose purpose was to serve
and preserve the interests of large white dominated construction firms.
The indigenous workers were excluded from this organisation not only
through racial structures but also as a result of skewed access to technol-
ogy, financial resources and expertise. The new majority Government was
keen to reverse this disadvantage, but it took time to bring change to the
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construction sector. Around 1985, a group of indigenous contractors came
together to form the Zimbabwe Building Contractors Association (ZBCA),
which grew to be the largest single representative group for indigenous
small and medium size contractors. Membership in 2006 was estimated at
about 50020. It lobbied the Government to implement affirmative actions
in support of marginalized workers in the construction sector.
Although many groups campaigned for better policy on indigenization
and affirmative action economy-wide, the breakthrough in the construc-
tion sector only came in the early 1990s at the instigation of the World
Bank. In its work in Zimbabwe, the World Bank realized the unsustainable
nature of the inequalities in the construction sector and urged the Govern-
ment to address the marginalization of indigenous agents. The outcome
of this was the Government of Zimbabwe Treasury Circular No. 2 in 1993.
The fact that the policy instrument on construction came from the Ministry
of Finance and not the Ministry of Construction further illustrates the hand
of the World Bank in the change (Sibanda, 2004). The incentives offered by
Bulawayo City, as described in the section on urban development, should
also be considered in light of this indigenization.
Treasury Circular No. 2 made it mandatory for all members of CIFOZ to
subcontract between 7.5% and 15% of project contract value to indigenous
members of the ZBCA, that all Government and parastatal projects award
at least 10% of project work to ZBCA members and that all tenders of less
than three million Zimbabwe dollars be awarded to ZBCA members only
(GoZ, 1993). It was envisaged that the policy would be reviewed with the
involvement of both CIFOZ and ZBCA and be mindful of ZBCA’s capacity
to absorb all such work. Towards the end of the 1990s, further indigeniza-
tion policies were initiated in the economy, such as a policy framework for
indigenization of the Zimbabwe economy21. For the purposes of the 1993
affirmative action policies in the construction sector, an indigenous build-
ing contractor was considered as one properly registered with both ZBCA
and the Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing.
It is within this context that local authorities have implemented pro-
grammes to support local indigenous contractors. Without affirmative ac-
tion, indigenous contractors were left to bid for the difficult and remote
contracts that CIFOZ members would not be interested in. While not all
ZBCA members have made progress, a review of G.G. Hardware and Con-
struction (Pvt) Ltd clearly showed a slow diversification from small public
sector projects in the 1980s and early 1990s to larger private sector jobs in
the late 1990s and after 2000. With greater experience and more resources
bases, G.G. Hardware moved from small projects of 15 to 30 housing units
in Bulawayo’s high density suburbs around 1991/1993 to bigger private
sector projects of up to 200 housing units each, such as the Mimosa Min-
ing Company projects in 2002 (G.G. Hardware and Construction, 2006).
Over the years, CIFOZ and ZBCA have operated in competition and
debated the definition of ‘indigenous Zimbabwean contractor’. Within
the changing political and economic environment, there now seems to be
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agreement that the two bodies should merge into one and that this single
organization will be more able to withstand globalization pressures. The
experience of the past two decades will be used to maintain regulations
that allow smaller and formerly marginalized groups to win reasonable
construction projects. While all key informants were of the view that the
merger is imminent, there was no clarity as to how inclusion mechanisms
would be enforced. This is an issue worth monitoring.
4.4.2 Managing centre local relations
We concur with Mutizwa-Mangiza (1991) that the fortunes of a local au-
thority (and that of Bulawayo City in particular) depend precariously on
the fate of the economy and the political relations it maintains with cen-
tral government. The relationship with local residents and business can
also be added to this. Our study has shown that, comparatively, Bulawayo
City has retained its high degree of political and administrative auton-
omy. It has earned great respect from central government and works well
in partnership with business, workers and residents. Bulawayo City lead-
ers expressed confidence that despite prevailing economic challenges and
discordant party politics, Bulawayo’s autonomy would endure, although
Sachikonye (2006: 16) considers otherwise. The economy has nonetheless
become one of the most difficult challenges facing Bulawayo. Dimensions
of this problem are often beyond the control of city authorities. It is this
context that has shaped Bulawayo’s best practices of the past and calls for
new approaches in the future.
This chapter has presented a series of indicators and conditions regard-
ing the four components of decent work, followed by detailed discus-
sions of legal changes and the frameworks for social dialogue. Among
the conclusions, is the fact that while there have been improvements in
legal provisions for decent work in comparison to previous decades, the
practical experiences are not so positive for workers in government, for
casual workers and for women. Bulawayo City’s role in most areas of de-
cent work is marginal, largely due to the institutional division of labour as
prescribed by law. However, a range of best practices have been especially
developed in areas of strategic planning and urban development, which
all, directly and indirectly, create a climate conducive to improvements in
decent work. We revisit some of the best practices.
4.4.3 Realistic strategic planning and citizen participation
Bulawayo has used existing planning legislation to implement planning
processes that involve and respond to community and business needs.
These strategic plans have provided certainty for investors and residents
alike. The master planning process and outcomes in the early 1980s, as well
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as the recent ones at the turn of the millennium, have shown Bulawayo
City to be a leader among other local authorities in the country. Not only
has it introduced regulations, it has also been innovative by accommodat-
ing a range of informal sector activities, such as tuck shops, phone shops
and urban agriculture. Bulawayo has a drier climate than other areas to
the north-east of the country. While other local authorities have continued
with prohibitive measures against urban agriculture, Bulawayo has rec-
ognized the activity, and put a promotion program in place that tackles
poverty and environmental challenges in a way compatible with the long-
term strategic needs of the city. The Netherlands-based RUAF Foundation
and SNV are key international partners in this endeavour.
The master planning process has utilized local experts, in contrast with
cities elsewhere in Africa that still depend on international consultants.
Public consultation was central to strategic planning and continues locally,
making use of the Citizens’ Charter with organizations such as Bulawayo
United Residents Association, Bulawayo Public Transport Association,
Bulawayo Affirmative Action Group, churches, NGOs, the Zimbabwe Na-
tional Chamber of Commerce and the Government of Zimbabwe. Similar
consultations also take place annually at various stages of the budget cy-
cle. While the process does not equate to full citizen empowerment, it does
indicate that Bulawayo values the contributions of stakeholders in its ad-
ministrative area and seeks to work in partnership with all of them.
It is recommended that the dialogue between Bulawayo City and the
tripartite partners continues to seek solutions to the water problems and
encourage business investments that take advantage of Bulawayo’s hin-
terland and its proximity to markets in South Africa.
4.4.4 The role of Bulawayo in promoting employment creation
We have shown that since the 1980s, Bulawayo City has forged partner-
ships with the private sector, Government and donors (e.g. World Bank,
USAID) to implement infrastructure and urban development programs.
Transparency has been key to this partnership in that Bulawayo has put
up clear indicators and incentives that enable all stakeholders to take part.
These incentives were utilized to promote the indigenization program, al-
though the gender dimension appears to be missing and needs to be pro-
moted more actively in the years ahead.
As part of the indigenization program in a bid to create employment,
Bulawayo has promoted training programs and incubator schemes. The
Kelvin North incubator project is probably the most innovative enterprise
promotion exercise. As part of their project, the council built factory shells
which were allocated to beneficiaries on five-year leases. It was hoped that
beneficiaries would start small industrial production activities and at the
end of the five-year period would have grown bigger and be able to move
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to new ‘open market’ premises. The shells were to be advertised and new
tenants brought in at the end of the five-year period. At the time of the sur-
vey in March/April 2006, almost all of the shells at Kelvin North were oc-
cupied and although carpentry enterprises were the most dominant, metal
work (e.g. door and window frames), battery recycling and textiles were
also some successful enterprises.
While key informants viewed Kelvin North as a successful project,
Bulawayo City officials conceded that there was need for a thorough re-
view of the program to identify the origins and destinations of the benefi-
ciaries. Without a detailed survey and analysis of administrative records,
it was not possible to tell what proportion of the Kelvin beneficiaries were
from the school-leavers training program or retrenched from formal in-
dustry. At the same time, the policy objective that beneficiaries ‘grow’ out
of the incubators appears not to have been met. Monitoring and enforcing
the five-year leases has been minimal and allegations of misuse have been
made by key informants at the site.
Of the 46 incubator shells at Kelvin North 1, about 46% were operating
under sub-letting arrangements where the operator had no lease with the
local authority, while 85% of the registered leases had expired in 2004. At
Kelvin North Phase 2, leases for 15 of the 16 incubators had expired in
2005 and seven of the operators were running under sub-letting arrange-
ments. There is certainly significant activity taking place at these project
sites, but whether they remain within the expectations of council needs to
be reviewed in detail.
In light of the fact that the incubators shells have been in operation for a
long time, there is need for a comprehensive evaluation to see if the origi-
nal policy objectives need to be revisited. Senior administrators have con-
ceded this point and promised to look into obtaining resources so that
these can be made available in the short term. The ILO could contribute
financially to this evaluation.
4.4.5 Bulawayo and the promotion of cooperatives
The formation and operation of cooperatives is currently guided by the
Cooperative Societies Act (1990 as revised) administered by the Register
of Cooperatives in the Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation
and Cooperatives. It is within this framework that the Kelvin North Train-
ing Centre was initiated around 1992–1993. It has created no less than
12 building cooperatives with a total membership of 120 and many more
labourers employed on a casual basis. With ongoing economic hardships,
only one cooperative remained in 2006. They build hundreds of houses but
officials are not able to provide exact figures. There were also three coop-
eratives dealing in metal work (whose peak membership was 60), but only
two remained in 2006. Other cooperatives initiated for crafts, agriculture,
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arts and drama have also found it difficult to remain in business since the
economic difficulties of the post-2000 period.
4.5 Decent work: evidence, obstacles and potential
4.5.1 Decent work and development in Zimbabwe
As previously stated, the prevailing socio-economic context of Zimbabwe
poses serious challenges for the promotion of decent work. The economy
declined by 32% between 1999 and 2005 (ZCTU, 2005b: 1) and business
confidence has also declined continuously (Intermarket Research, 2004:
36–40). Over the past six years, Zimbabwe has been the only SADC coun-
try where investment has fallen to extremely low levels and both growth
and employment creation have been negative (CB Richard Ellis, 2006; ILO,
2005c: 6; Intermarket Research, 2004;). In this context, the goal of economic
recovery and employment creation becomes the highest priority relative to
other decent work goals; whether the jobs created can be considered as de-
cent work or not becomes a secondary issue. This is why workers offer to
work extra hours without pay – simply to keep their jobs.
The previous chapters have demonstrated that while an empirical out-
line of the decent work indicators in Zimbabwe can be compiled, the bulk
of the statistics will only be estimates showing trends in workers’ condi-
tions. Whether data is collected from national institutions, employer or-
ganizations, trade unions, enterprises or individual workers has a strong
bearing on the accuracy and validity of the information. Although the
decent work concept has a recent history, demands for improvement in
working conditions are not new and recall the struggle of Zimbabwean
workers from colonial days to the present. However, few in Zimbabwe ex-
pressed familiarity with the term ‘decent work’ and even worker represen-
tatives in the construction sector were ignorant of it. Thus, the challenge of
decent work is not only conceptual but methodological. The key question
is how can it be measured? In regards to Zimbabwe, this includes finding
the right institutions to facilitate the dissemination and implementation of
the agenda at the local level while locating this agenda in national priori-
ties.
The ongoing ILO/SAMAT program to promote decent work has crys-
tallized around the recently launched Zimbabwe Decent Work Country
Program 2006–2007 (ZDWCP). This has been largely a national affair in
which local authorities have had little or no involvement; decent work
is not a pertinent operational concept and the ILO is not visible at the
local level. Broad consultations for the ZDWCP involved tripartite part-
ners: Government, the Employers Federation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ) and
ZCTU. In this national program the objective was to integrate decent
work into the country’s development plans, with Zimbabwe prioritiz-
ing Millennium Development Goal 1 on poverty reduction, Millennium
P1: SFK/UKS P2: SFK/UKS QC: SFK/UKS T1: SFK
BLBK177-Werna May 30, 2009 16:13
128 Labour Conditions for Construction
Development Goal 3 on social protection and reduction of the impact of
HIV/AIDS in the workplace, and Millennium Development Goal 6 on up-
holding and strengthening social dialogue and tripartite consultation.
For the decent work concept to succeed at the local level, it is imper-
ative that the ILO broadens its work in Zimbabwe beyond ‘traditional
stakeholders’ and expands to work with more micro-level partners. It is
important to note the macro nature of the ZDWP and hence the need to
translate it to local level actions. HIV/AIDS in the workplace appears to
have been a key area of activity for labour unions for a long time now
and can be combined with job creation in the informal sector to provide a
package that responds to the country’s needs.
Recommendation
We recommend that work to reduce HIV/AIDS in the workplace not only
be strengthened but also broadened and used as a launch pad to consider
other aspects of decent work, especially gender, occupational accidents
and post-accident care. To be more visible, the ILO should take a multi-
pronged approach at the local level; working with NECs, local authority
unions and strategic teams, as well as collectively with all of them. Second,
promoting dialogue continues debates on broader issues of employment
creation and poverty alleviation. Bulawayo is already well positioned to
be receptive, considering its work in the urban agriculture sector and the
best practice in industrial incubators.
4.5.2 Methodological and conceptual considerations
This separates the population to expose the different categories and high-
light the labour dimensions. However, unlike the 1999 Indicator Monitor-
ing Labour Force Surveys (CSO, 2000: 45), the 2002 census (CSO, 2002: 83)
does not display disaggregation to show the communal farmers compo-
nent within the economically active population. Ideally, the economically
active population should be divided into the unemployed, the communal
area farmers, commercial farm workers, the rest of formal employment
and informal sector employment.
The inclusion or exclusion of peasants and the informal sector has also
varied, with most international organizations and NGOs putting these in
the unemployed category. As we saw earlier in this chapter in Section 4.3,
there is no consistency in the methods used for data collection over time
and across institutions. There are variations even within the CSO. The 1997
Inter-census Demographic Survey (ICDS) analyzed activities for the ten to
fourteen-year age group, while the national census of 1992 did not. We also
noted that the CSO definition of children switches between ten to fourteen
years, five to seventeen years and also to five to fourteen years old. See
Figure 4.8.
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Total population 11.9 million
Young and old 4.98 (41.7%)
Adults (14 and above) 6.98 (58.3%)
Inactive 2.01 (28.9%)
Economically active (labour) 4.96 (71.1%)
Communal farmers (peasants) 1.70 (34.2%)
Rest of labour 2.27 (65.8%)
Unemployed 0.30 (6%)
Employed 2.97 (59.8%)
Figure 4.8 Population structure and labour (1999−2000)
Source: Modified from 1999 Indicator Monitoring Labour Force Survey (CSO, 2000: 45).
In the national census for 1992 the broad definition of unemployment
was used, yet all other censuses and surveys before and after have used
the strict definition. In the strict definition, unemployed persons are those
of age 15 and over who, during the period of reference, were without work
and were actively seeking employment. The indicators of actively ‘seek-
ing employment’ used in surveys do not capture the social capital-based
methods utilized by most unemployed people. In the broad definition, the
difference is that the criterion of ‘actively looking for work’ is excluded.
Using the strict definition generally used by the Zimbabwe Government
leads to statistically low levels of unemployment. The reference period has
also been used selectively, varying between seven days for the 1982 census
and all the IM-LFS, and 12 months for the 1992 and 2002 census and the
1987 and 1997 ICDS. Thus, figures for unemployment rates vary depend-
ing on whether the strict or broad definition is used, whether a long or
short reference period is used, and whether the peasants and the informal
sector are defined as employed.
Political tension and economic crisis has made data sharing and research
a very sensitive issue. Individuals and institutions feel so insecure that
they are not prepared to release even what should be routine adminis-
trative and public information (e.g. NSSA office in Bulawayo). These per-
ceptions make data collection more difficult and research less plausible. A
major methodological problem is that statistics collected for different pur-
poses and at different institutional levels either do not add up or tell only
part of the story. It would be more fruitful if data collection for this decent
work framework could be repeated in subsequent years and incorporated
into the work of key institutions such as CSO, NSSA, NECs and ZCTU.
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Recommendation
We recommend that the ILO strengthen its dialogue with CSO and NSSA
regarding data collection and analysis format. This dialogue should target
the periodic surveys done in particular by the CSO, with a view to incorpo-
rating decent work data frameworks into the design of the data collection
and analysis.
There has to be an obvious benefit to all these organizations before they
can adopt some of the given frameworks or indicators. NSSA is best placed
and has shown willingness to improve its data compilation exercises and,
in particular, to add the hours lost to the economy due to workplace acci-
dents and injuries. There must also be pressure from constituencies such as
the labour movements and NECs for such mainstreaming to gain ground.
As part of the national decent work program in the short or medium term,
it is necessary to strengthen NECs as partnership platforms for all stake-
holders in promoting decent work.
Statistically, the empirical level of data collection is important; whether
the research uses data from individual workers and their unions at shop
floor level, whether data comes from regional and national representa-
tive organizations, or from national authorities and departments such as
CSO and NSSA. This study uses data from all sources, although it is clear
that a comprehensive shop-floor level study for the construction sector is
needed.
4.5.3 Women’s rights at work and health and safety in the
construction sector
The labour movement and workers’ current health and safety work has
rightly focused on HIV/AIDS, with a view to using the workplace as a
source of information on the epidemic and circulating information on best
practices among workers in regards to protecting and working with those
affected. This theme is also central to the recently unveiled Decent Work
Country Programme, which has scope for further improvements at the
local level.
Recommendation
First, the ZDWP priority could be the most appropriate framework to
mainstream the sexual and labour rights of women in the workplace.
Using the same platforms, specific issues affecting women in the con-
struction sector can be given a more central role with a view to changing
men’s behaviour as well as management practices. In particular, clarity
on definitions of harassment, based on women’s experiences in the
construction sector, would need to be more explicit, together with the
penalties against violations. This is not an issue for the construction sector
alone but for the entire Zimbabwe labour force, although those in the
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construction sector could benefit from their counterparts’ experiences in
other parts of the world.
Literature and key informants in Bulawayo show that there have been
improvements in the legal provisions that benefit women in areas such
as maternity leave. However, in practice both workers and officials at the
local level are not well conversant with how this applies and often have
to refer to the Ministry for clarification. A key aspect of gender equality is
to evaluate the extent to which the new legal provisions are understood
and implemented. Achievements can then be used as a process to build
confidence in the new legal provisions among all those involved.
A second point is that occupational health and accidents at work remain
key issues that need to be addressed. Underreporting both in the formal
and informal sector is of particular concern. The existing systems are over-
stretched but could be effective with more local level inter-institutional
dialogue and harmonization. The proposed decent work audit would pro-
vide a construction project based framework to revisit issues of health at
work and give the local authority an entry point to promote conditions of
workers, even if these are not its employees.
4.5.4 The informal economy: opportunities in Bulawayo
The need to promote the informal sector as a generator of employment was
recognized as far back as the Growth with Equity policy document and
the First National Transitional Development Plan (1982–1985). Through SI
216 of 1994, enacted in terms of the Regional Town and Country Planning
Act, the Government relaxed controls. This gave local authorities room to
permit employment creation activities in residential areas. Activities such
as tailoring, bookmaking, wood and stone carving, car repairs, carpentry,
shoe repair and tin smithing are some of the activities that blossomed.
This book has given best practice details in the provision of industrial in-
cubators in Bulawayo (e.g. Kelvin North). These complemented a broader
Home Industries policy promoted throughout the country in the late 1980s
and 1990s in which city councils provided serviced land for commercial
SME activities close to low-income residential areas. The policy environ-
ment also led to informal activities even in the CBD, especially following
the ESAP years in the 1990s.
In this chapter we have pointed to the rapid growth of the informal sec-
tor since 1990 and noted the shift from manufacturing to trading and ser-
vices in both the formal and informal sectors. Kanyenze et al. (2003) further
noted that in the informal sector over the same period, women have been
squeezed out of the manufacturing sectors and into services and trading as
well as from large operational units to increasingly small ones. However,
in general, despite growth in informal sector jobs and internal changes, no
detailed studies on decent work are available. The Training and Research
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Support Centre (TARSC) has flagged occupational health issues (Loewen-
son, 2001b), but these remain a key concern, especially in the context of
HIV/AIDS22. Thus, any future decent work initiatives in the informal sec-
tor must take gender and occupational health into consideration, as with
the economy in general.
In May to July 2005, the Government launched Operation Muram-
batsvina (OM) which destroyed a significant number of these infor-
mal enterprises and settlements throughout the country, as a method of
dealing with perceived economic and environmental problems in urban
areas (GoZ, 2005c). NGOs and the ‘international community’ condemned
the policy and have continued to express concern about the negative im-
pacts on people’s livelihoods23. There is still debate on the reasoning be-
hind the operation (Potts, 2006; Sachikonye, 2006). Unfortunately, the few
detailed studies on the impact of this policy have not included Bulawayo
(Sachikonye, 2006). However, the OM appears to be a reversal of the Gov-
ernment’s SI of 1994. Court rulings in Bulawayo regarding this policy have
directed all parties to move forward through dialogue and Bulawayo City
is pursuing this vigorously.
As a consequence of OM, there is an ongoing vigorous and visible coun-
trywide reorganization and relocation of small enterprises and informal
sector activities. This has generated new opportunities to support employ-
ment creation and decent work dialogue. There is a good opportunity in
creating jobs through the informal sector, not only to evaluate the impacts
of Operation Murabatsvina but also as a method by which the ILO can
make itself visible at the local level and address urgent economic national
needs.
Recommendation
We recommend that in Bulawayo, the ILO encourage stakeholders to re-
visit the role of the informal sector, making use of experiences from the
home industries and industrial incubator programs. The dialogue on job
creation should seek to move beyond Murambatsvina by meeting the
needs of the poor while upholding the standards expected by Govern-
ment, into which the decent work standards can be mainstreamed.
We recommend that the ILO support detailed research and documen-
tation into the dynamics, employment and economic impacts of informal
sector construction in Bulawayo including the role of the diaspora injiva.
This is a feasible short-term project which would act as a focal point for
broader policy and program creation for the informal sector in Bulawayo
post-Murambatsvina. The project can have direct impact on the Reserve
Bank of Zimbabwe’s Homelink project.
Sharing of knowledge and experience with decent work and the infor-
mal sector should cascade to cities in Zimbabwe in the short term (one
to two years) and to cities in the SADC in the medium term (two to five
years) and others in Africa such as Nairobi (Kenya) and Accra (Ghana)
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where programs to reposition the role of the informal sector are also
ongoing.
4.5.5 Future activities: Bulawayo’s procurement dividend and the
decent work audit
As a local authority, Bulawayo has expertise and experience in using envi-
ronmental and financial audit schemes (Bulawayo City, 2000). It has also
demonstrated commitment to partnership with the private sector, Govern-
ment, workers and its residents. Donors have also worked with Bulawayo
City in the past, and even in the current climate of economic decline, some
international organizations have invested their resources to help with the
city’s urban poverty programme. Bulawayo City is not only a large em-
ployer in the city, it is also a consumer of resources and services and a pur-
chaser and commissioner of extensive building and construction related
work. It has the most potential to change people’s welfare and to build
stronger local economies and sustainable communities. It can and should
use the above assets to respond to the challenge of decent work and in
particular to help change attitudes and patterns of behaviour among all
those, worker and corporate, operating within its area of jurisdiction.
Recommendation
We recommend that using its procurement services and the commission-
ing of construction works, Bulawayo City can put in place a decent work
audit scheme that will act as a policy instrument to encourage and reward
those organizations and institutions that strive to promote decent work.
The indicators to the audit would be in line with priorities of workers and
the ZDWCP: progress on health and safety at the workplace, on reducing
the impact of HIV/AIDS and gender and social dialogue – largely assessed
by the workers themselves.
There is synergy between what the local authority does, and the pat-
terns of behaviour and welfare of people in the city. Within the climate
of partnership that prevails between Bulawayo City and other actors, the
decent work audit scheme would operate in tandem with the environmen-
tal management audits and EIAs. The key is that it is not Bulawayo City
alone that will do the monitoring but all the stakeholders within the local
partnership. The NECs, NSSA, employer and employee unions would be
encouraged to incorporate these audits into their negotiating forums. As
part of the tendering process, Bulawayo City would reward and award
contracts to those making progress towards meeting decent work condi-
tions for their workforce.
There are currently obstacles that would work against this recommen-
dation. There is weak institutional capacity at the level of construction
industry and worker’s organization in Bulawayo. Consequently, capacity
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building and investment in manpower in these institutions is needed as
part of the broader programme of decent work and to ensure that the de-
cent work audits make a difference in practice.
Employers are likely to view such a decent work audit as simply another
unnecessary burden added to the challenges of operating in a hyperinfla-
tionary environment. It may therefore be more effective to promote the
scheme more forcefully only when the economy starts to recover. A further
challenge is that informal sector workers and employers who are outside
the existing administrative regimes would find it difficult to incorporate
the audit scheme.
4.5.6 Obstacles and potentials for decent work promotion in Bulawayo
Decent work promotion has never been a direct policy area for the Bul-
awayo City Council, largely due to the way its responsibilities are defined
in the statutes. However, all its activities in service delivery and translation
of Government policy into local programs, as well as its relations with its
own employees, are indirectly relevant to decent work.
Employment creation and setting the conditions that enable investment
are key areas of potential. While the city has done a lot to provide infras-
tructure, land and incentives to invest, its marketing strategy has not taken
a vigorous regional approach to capturing the potentials offered by exist-
ing transport infrastructure, population flows and proximity to Botswana
and South Africa. It must also begin to make better use of the National
University of Science and Technology.
Obstacles to decent work in the area of employment creation include the
negative image of Bulawayo as both water-scarce and indifferent, as wit-
nessed during the drought and water crisis in 1991–1992. There is a global
awareness regarding the need to deal with climate change and the future
of ‘desert cities’. Bulawayo needs to be put in this bracket of cities and
have support mobilized to deal with its water problems. It suffers from
the negative impacts of the ESAP that led to decline in manufacturing.
Centre local relations are also essential. While direct interference by
Government is not at levels similar to cities like Harare and Mutare, Bu-
lawayo suffers from contradictions because it is perceived as a perennial
home of the ruling party’s political opponents; first to ZAPU until 1987
and then MDC from 1999. Central government’s neglect in making timely
investments in the water capacity of the city is often placed amongst these
political contradictions (Zaaijer, 1998).
The potential to play a role in areas such as social dialogue, health and
safety at work, equality and so on all depend on the room for manoeuvre
provided in the legislation and centre local relations. In the future, Bul-
awayo can only take a policy and regulatory role in these areas in partner-
ship with employee and employer organizations.
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Notes
Chapter opening image: For one US dollar a day, Grace cleans the
windows of a building under construction on the seaside of Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania. Photograph courtesy of Marcel Crozet, ILO.
(1) The Kondozi Estate case is noteworthy. This was an enterprise
which employed thousands of workers and conducted daily ex-
ports of horticultural produce to both South Africa and Europe, but
the estate was seized and handed over to the Agricultural and Ru-
ral Development Authority (ARDA) in 2004. It is now derelict with
land portions used to grow maize under the ‘Operation Maguta’, a
food security project led by the Zimbabwe National Army.
(2) See, for example, ‘Chinese get ready to cash in on Zimbabwe build-
ing boom’, Financial Gazette, Harare, 20 January 2005.
(3) See for example, ‘Construction industry appeals for support: little
activity taking place countrywide. Established companies settling
for small jobs’, Business Herald, Harare, 27 January 2000 and ‘10,000
likely to lose their jobs in construction’, Business Herald, Harare, 11
January 2001.
(4) See for example, ‘Closures impact on construction industry’, The
Daily News, Harare, 14 February 2003.
(5) See for example, ‘Chinese get ready to cash in on Zimbabwe Build-
ing Boom’, Financial Gazette, Harare, 20 January 2005.
(6) Amendments of the statutes have abolished the office of the Exec-
utive Mayor and reverted to the old system of ceremonial mayor
with effect from mid-2008.
(7) The role of ZINWA in urban areas was abolished with effect from
1 February 2009 and responsibilities returned to urban councils.
Bulawayo City contested/resisted the role of ZINWA until it was
abolished.
(8) Elections in 2006 in Chitungwiza to elect mayor and councillors did
not bring an end to the appointed commission. However, following
national political dialogue in an attempt to reverse the country’s cri-
sis, the two major political parties decided to elect a non-executive
mayor for Harare from outside the political parties. Thursday 3rd
July, the 46-member Harare council chose Muchadeyi Masunda, a
lawyer, to be non-executive mayor. This was preceded by amend-
ments to the Urban Councils Act that scrapped the office of execu-
tive mayor.
(9) Bulawayo hosted five of the eight largest textile manufactur-
ers, such as Merspin, Cotton Printers, Merlin and Security Mills
(Zaaijer, 1998: 23).
(10) One US$ = Z$55.0660 at 2000.
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(11) This data is not available in the Labour Force Survey Reports using
45 hours as the cut-off point.
(12) See Munhumeso vs Minister of Labour, Zimbabwe Law Reports.
(13) Employment rate is the number of employed persons aged 15 years
and above divided by the total population in that age group multi-
plied by one hundred.
(14) Chigumura literally translated means ‘vicious displacement’ and
was the term used by Africans to describe forced retrenchments in
industry in colonial days.
(15) Figures provided by Zimbabwe Construction and Allied Trades
workers Union, Bulawayo.
(16) ZCTU has 35 affiliates. There were about 33 in 1995.
(17) See Taylor vs Ministry of Higher Education and Anor, 1996 (2)
Zimbabwe Law Reports 772 (S).
(18) During a visit to Belmont Construction, workers were having late
tea with bread provided by the employer.
(19) Estimates in Z$ as at April 2006 provided by Mrs A.N. Kwang-
wama, Head of Department, Rural and Urban Planning, University
of Zimbabwe.
(20) Five years earlier, the Business Herald put the figure at only 120. See
‘Building Materials Up 56pc, says CSSO’, Business Herald, Harare,
26 April 2001.
(21) The fast-track land reform of 2000 and beyond is often referred to
as a broader form of indigenization of the economy.
(22) See ‘Informal Sector Exposed’, The Herald, Harare, Friday, 30 June
2006.
(23) See Zimbabwe Report at http://unhabitat.org. See also a study
on the impact of ‘Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order’ in
Zimbabwe, ActionAid International – Southern Africa Partnership
Programme (SAPP-ZIMBABWE) in collaboration with Combined
Harare Residents Association (CHRA) and Zimbabwe Peace Project
(ZPP), August 2005.
